When the Forest was Ours:  : Ownership and Partnership in a CDM Forestry Project in Southwestern Ethiopia by Gashaw, Aynalem Getachew
i 
 
When the Forest was Ours: 
Ownership and Partnership in a CDM Forestry Project in 
Southwestern Ethiopia 
Aynalem Getachew Gashaw 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Philosophy in  
Culture, Environment and Sustainability 
Centre for Development and the Environment 
University of Oslo 
Blindern, Norway 
                                                                                     1st of August 2012
ii 
 
 
iii 
 
                                                   Table of content  
   TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………………………………….III 
   TABLES AND FIGURES………………………………………………………………………………………….V 
   ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………..........................VI 
    LIST OF ACRONYMS……………………………………………………………………………….VIII 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF THE STUDY AREA ............................................................... 3 
1.2.1 Research Area............................................................................................................... 11 
1.3 RESEARCH RATIONALE ........................................................................................................ 15 
2. RESEARCH METHOD ............................................................................................................. 18 
2.1 FIELD WORK DURATION ...................................................................................................... 18 
2.2 SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW ............................................................................................. 19 
2.3 FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION (FGD) ....................................................................................... 21 
2.4 PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION ................................................................................................ 21 
2.4 ETHICAL ISSUES ................................................................................................................... 21 
3. CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM (CDM) .................................................................... 23 
3.1 HOW DOES CDM WORK ....................................................................................................... 26 
3.2 CDM AND FOREST CONSERVATION ..................................................................................... 28 
SOURCE:  ADAPTED FROM SMITH AND SCHERR (2002) ..................................................... 31 
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................... 31 
4.1 POLITICAL ECOLOGY ............................................................................................................ 32 
5. WHO OWNS HUMBO FOREST? ............................................................................................. 37 
5.1 LAND TENURE IN THE RESEARCH SETTING ............................................................................ 37 
5.2 WHO OWNS HUMBO FOREST? ............................................................................................... 40 
5.3 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT ........................................................................................... 44 
5.3.1 National, Regional and Local Government Institutions ............................................... 44 
5.3.1.1 Who has power in the government structure? ........................................................... 51 
5.3.2 Multilateral Institution and Non-Government organizations ....................................... 54 
5.3.2.1 The World Bank ......................................................................................................... 54 
5.3.2.2 World Vision Australia .............................................................................................. 57 
5.3.3 World Vision Ethiopia .................................................................................................. 57 
5.3.4 The Seven Community Cooperatives ............................................................................ 59 
5.4 PARTNERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION ...................................................................................... 63 
iv 
 
5.5 ARE THE COOPERATIVES AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES? ............................................................... 73 
5.5 WORLD VISION AND DONORS RELATION ............................................................................. 84 
5.6 STATE RELATION WITH WORLD BANK, NGOS AND COOPERATIVES ..................................... 88 
5.7 STATE AND NGO RELATIONSHIP .......................................................................................... 92 
5.8 STATE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP ............................................................................. 95 
6. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 98 
REFERENCE ............................................................................................................................ 102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Tables and Figures  
Tables; 
Table 1: Cooperatives Carbon Credit Payment Distribution 
Table 2; CDM forest type 
Table 3; Household coping mechanisms for animal fodders 
Table 4; Emergency Food Aid, Nutrition and Safety net Support Beneficiaries 
Table 5: World Bank Loans to Ethiopian Government 
 
Figures; 
Figure 1; CDM process and Institutions 
Figure2; Ethiopian Government power Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 Acknowledgements  
Many people have contributed to the success of my study and successful completion of 
this thesis. My advisor, Professor Desmond McNeill, deserves my sincere gratitude for 
giving me constructive and scholarly feedbacks beginning from the early inception of the 
project topic all the way through the final draft of the thesis.  
 
This project would not be possible without support from my family and friends. Special 
thanks go to my mom, to very important friends back home, Meleskachew Amha, 
Rebecca Tadesse and Haregeweyen Admasu, for always believing in me, and to all the 
support and encouragement that you have given me in all the choices that I make in life. 
Friends like Danel, Messay, Alemitu, Felek, Hayel and his family made it easy and 
possible for me to contact all stakeholders without much difficulty. God bless you all. 
 
Friends in Oslo; Kristine Kvellestad, Helge Holtermann, Hanne Kvellestad, Margrethe 
Kvellestad, Svein Anders Kvellestad, Aud- Karin Hovi and family, Zewge Abate, John 
Gunnar Raen and his family, Wolela and her family and all my classmates, and specially 
Larissa Stendie and Lotte Liegmann , also deserve my heartfelt gratitude for welcoming 
me and making my two years of study exciting and enlightening.  
 
My genuine gratitude also goes to the Norwegian Government Quota Program which 
kindly made possible my study through its financial support. I am also thankful to for the 
Center for Development and Environment for financial provisions it made to support my 
research. 
 
vii 
 
Last but not least, I thank all my respondents very much for their amazing cooperation 
without which this work would have not been possible. 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
ADP        Area Development Programs 
A/R          Afforestation/ Reforestation 
CCBA       Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance 
CDM         Clean Development Mechanism 
CSA           Central Statistic Agency  
CER           Certified Emission Reduction 
COP           Conference of Parties  
DA             Development Agent 
DOE           Designated Operational Entity 
DNA          Designated National Authority 
EC             Ethiopian Calendar 
EPA           Environmental Protection Authority 
EFAP         Ethiopian Forestry Action Plan 
EHRS         Ethiopian Highland Reclamation Study 
ET              Emission Trading 
FAO          Food and Agricultural Organization 
FGD           Focus Group Discussion 
GCF          Green Climate Fund 
GDP         Gross Domestic Product 
GHG         Green House Gas 
HH            Household 
ICA           International Cooperative Alliance 
ix 
 
ILO          International Labour Organization 
IMF          International Monetary Fund 
 IUCN        The World Conservation Union  
 JI              Joint Implementation 
KP            Kyoto Protocol 
MOP         Meeting of Parties 
NCS         National Conservation Strategy 
NGO        Non-Governmental Organization 
NORD      Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
ODA         Official Development Assistance 
PASDAP   A Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty  
PBS          Protection of Basic Service  
PDD          Project Development Document  
SCRP        Soil Conservation Research Project 
SD            Sustainable Development  
SNNPR      Southern Nation Nationalities People Region 
SIDA         Swedish International Development cooperation Agency 
UN              United Nation 
UNFCC      United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNISCO    United Nation Education, Science and Culture Organization 
USD           United State Dollar  
WB            World Bank 
WVE         World Vision Ethiopia  
WVA         World Vision Austral
1 
 
Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
Having an economy dependent on natural resource climate change impact is the biggest 
threat for the Ethiopian economy Ethiopian economy.  According to CSA (1994) report, 
small holders farming activity which in some places also includes forestry is the 
dominant sector that accounts for 45% of GDP, 90 % of export product and 80% of 
employment opportunities in the country. Crop production is estimated to contribute on 
average 60 percent, livestock accounts for 27 percent and forestry and other subsectors 
constitute 13 percent of the total agricultural value.  
 
Forestry has a significant role in the country’s economy and particularly in rural 
livelihood. It is a source of energy, food, employment and income. It has a dominant 
share in the domestic energy supply. According to Damel (2001:5), 70% of energy is 
obtained from forestry while 8 % and 7% of it are obtained from dung and agricultural 
residue respectively. Tedla and Kifle (1999: 20) put it to 81.8% on fuel wood 
consumption and the rest shared by dung and crop residue. The share of forestry in the 
country’s GDP varied significantly. Million (2001:2) indicated that if the various 
contributions of forestry - fuel wood and charcoal consumption, non-wood forest product 
utilization and the environmental benefits of forest - are considered, the contribution will 
be much higher than 10%. Berhanu etal (1988 cited in Million 2001:3) indicate forestry 
employment in public offices and industry reached 35,000 and in commercial wood fuel 
harvesting reached 400,000 persons or 50% of the employment opportunity in the sector.  
 
Deforestation is one of the major environmental issues in the country since it is regarded 
as one of the main causes of the current land degradation. Estimates of forest cover, rate 
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and the extent of destruction is recorded differently in different literatures.  For example 
Dessie and Christiansson (2008: 266) indicated that the forest cover of the country was 
16% in 1972 and within 28 years, it reduced to 3%. On the other hand Badege (2001: 8) 
claim that 40% of the country’s land was covered by forest reduced to 3% within a 
century. Damel (2001: 6) underlined the lack of reliable source of information on the 
range of the forest cover and the extent of destruction.  He cited EFAP (1994) and IUCN 
(1990), which estimated the country’s forest, cover to be 66% of the land including the 
Savanna woodlands, and in 1989, only 2.7% of this forest covers was left. He indicated 
that the rate of deforestation was estimated to be between 150,000 and 200,000 ha per 
annum. He predicted that with such a rate there will be nothing but a heavily disturbed 
forest land in inaccessible part of the country within a few decades. The 2010 FAO 
country report estimated that without taking into account reforestation which offset rate 
of deforestation, the rate of forest distraction in the country is 140,000 ha per annum. The 
same report states that “…. the total area under forest…… for the year 2000 and 2005 is 
4,073,213 ha and 2,699,561 ha respectively………. From the total forest areas, it is 
assumed that Closed
1, Dense and Open forests cover 20, 17 and 63 percents respectively” 
(FAO 2010:7). 
 
Forest destruction is one of the contributors of GHG emission, its contribution is 
estimated to be about 29% of emission from fossil fuel and cement production between 
1980 and 1989 and 34% in the early 1990s ( Smith and  et al 2005: 323-324).  Therefore, 
addressing issues of forest destruction is part of climate change mitigation strategy. 
Conservation of tropical forest was later incorporated as part of the Kyoto Protocol, Joint 
Implementation namely Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). CDM projects aimed to 
                                                          
1
 Closed: crown cover of the upper stratum exceeds 80 percent 
Dense: crown cover of the upper strata is between 50 to 80 percent 
Open: crown cover of the upper stratum is between 20 to 50 percent 
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pave the way for international finance and technology transfer and it also aimed to create 
cost effective emission reduction for the developed countries. CDM has two stated 
objectives: lowering the cost of achieving emission reduction and also promotion of 
sustainable development (SD) of the host country (Ibid: 322).  
 
In 2005, the afforestation and reforestation project (A/R CDM) with objectives of 
enhancing GHG removals by sinks and improving the livelihood condition of the local 
community started its implementation in Humbo Wereda of southwestern Ethiopia. 
National and local actors, including seven farmer’s cooperatives, local and international 
non-governmental organizations and the World Bank have been involved as project 
partners. The project covered 2,728 hectares of land area which will impact the lives of 
48,893 members of the community. By 2020, the project is expected to sink 33,685.2 
tons of carbon. The project, which has achieved CCBA accreditation, is also aimed at 
supporting the local livelihood through employment creation and other development 
activities 
 
The overall objective of this thesis is to understand the local, national and global actor’s 
interaction and their influence in the project outcomes. 
 
1.2. Background Information of the Study area 
Ethiopia is a country located in the Horn of Africa stretching 3 to 15 degrees North 
latitude and 33 to 48 degrees east longitude.  The country is geographically diversified 
with the range of 4,620 meters above sea level, like mount Ras Dejen in the north, to the 
Afar Depression of about 110 meters below sea level. This variation in altitude resulted 
in the climatic, vegetation and soil varieties that the country is endowed with. The 
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country’s plant species are estimated to be 6,500 to7, 000 of which 12 percent are 
endemic (Damel 2001:55). According to Damel, with an estimated annual loss of 
150,000 to 200,000 hectares of forest land, what is largely left is a heavily disturbed 
forest in inaccessible areas of the country. The loss of forest cover has adverse affects on 
livelihoods of communities as well as on biodiversity. It is reported that Ethiopia has 
some 119 species on the IUCN Red List of threatened species, and eight of which are 
considered critically endangered (Damel 2001: 58).  
 
According to Ethiopian development plan (PASDAP 2006) and the recently released 
Climate-Resilient Green Economy strategy (2011), agriculture will continue to be the 
engine of growth. The potential of agriculture, in its current structure, to lead into 
economic transformation and poverty reduction, has been debated for a long time now.  
Even those who agree on the importance of agriculture to Ethiopia’s development still 
debate on the kind of agriculture needed and how much growth in agriculture is required 
for it to have significant role in poverty reduction. In spite of its importance to the 
national economy, agriculture is also the major source of vulnerability.  As a result, 
farmers have always been the recipients of enormous volumes of food aid and other 
humanitarian assistance. The drought cycle and environmental degradation made most of 
Ethiopian farmers’ dependent on food hand-outs. 
 
Environmental problems such as land degradation, deforestation and soil erosion have 
dominated agendas in the county’s socio-economic, political discussions as well as in 
multilateral and bilateral relations since the 1950s.  Since then, various measures were 
taken to halt further degradation and to rehabilitate fertility of the soil albeit with no 
significant improvements recorded. Research on the area points out various reasons for 
the failure of those measures: the promotion of technology and practices that are not well 
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suited to the local situation, inappropriate socio-economic policies, and tenure insecurity 
are the predominant explanations (Tedla and Lemma 1999, Dessalegn 2003, Crummey 
and Nelson 2003, Aynalem 2009, and Dessie and Christiansson 2008).  
 
There is no consensus on the causes of land degradation and deforestation in the country, 
but there exists a growing interest for research from wide varieties of discipline (both 
from natural and social sciences) indicating diversified causal factors. When it comes to 
the country’s conservation policies and practices, they are mainly focused on the neo-
Malthusians arguments. According to Dessalegn (2003:206-207) the writings of the 
expatriate environmentalists in the 1950s and 60s were the basis of a conventional 
wisdom for a long time even if they were not supported by empirical evidence.  
 
In the 1980s, two important studies were prepared, namely The Ethiopian Highland 
Reclamation Study (EHRS) conducted by FAO in 1986 and The Soil Conservation 
Research Project (SCRP), conducted, in 1988, by Hurni, advisor for Ethiopian Ministry 
of Agriculture. The results from these seminal works are still cited by academics and 
policy makers although they exhibit problems that are related to the unreliability and 
ambiguity of data and methodological concerns. The soil loss rate estimation of these two 
studies indicates that most of Ethiopian highland farm land would go out of production 
within a century. EHRS estimates that nearly 2 billion tons of soil is lost annually when 
the SCRP study claimed the loss to be 1.5 billion ton per year (Dessalegn 2003: 207, 
Mahmud et al 2005:21, 31).   
 
Such alarming findings and the frequent droughts shape the environmental thinking of the 
Ethiopian state. According to Dessalegn, the legacy of expatriate pessimism promoted “a 
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policy framework that can only be described as ‘unilateral’ and ‘state centered’, with a 
strong tendency to exclude pluralist approaches” (Dessalegn 2003: 207). The state 
becomes the natural stewardess of the earth with its policy prescriptions that are 
predominantly occupied by the technicality of nature conservation. All the expatriate 
writings and research underline the cause as mismanagement of land by the land holders 
(Dessalegn 2003). Employing scientific conservation over indigenous experience became 
the right and preferable way of nature conservation.  As Blaikie (1989) indicated, 
Ethiopia is one of the countries in Africa that applied and is still applying bench terrace 
construction disregarding the indigenous knowledge that is found to be the most logical 
method to curb land degradation; intercropping and relay cropping. It is known now that 
the characteristic of slope has less to do than the role of rain splash in determining the 
rate of erosion (Blaikie 1989: 22).  
 
Ethiopian government sought to reverse environmental degradation and food insecurity 
both in its economic and conservation strategies. In general popular and academic 
narratives in Ethiopia ascribe environmental problems, which are manifested in 
deforestation and rural crisis, to the product of population pressure and backward 
agricultural technology (Crummey and Nelson 2003:91, Dessie and Christiansson 2008: 
263, Guilloze and Bliss 2010:239 Dessalegn 2003: 208, Mohamed 1999:6). Such kind of 
problem identification draws its base from the global environmental narratives.  These 
narratives made it possible for the global and national actors including nongovernmental 
organizations to intervene in the management of natural resources.  
 
The policy making in African countries follows the dominant perspective in the 
international arena. This is evident in the Ethiopian policy concept. Ethiopia has now 
introduced its Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy, which is going to replace the 
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Sustainable Development Strategy of the country following the global emphasis on such 
perspective. Crummey and Bassett (2003:12) indicate the subordinate role of African 
states to the bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, to which African states are indebted 
for funding and expertise.  They posit that African environmental thinking is shaped by 
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies such as USAID, FAO, World Bank, United Nation 
Environmental Program, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and 
the World Wide Fund for Nature. They also indicated the role of educational institute in 
shaping African experts: 
Most of African experts trained in environmentally related sciences were 
trained abroad and imbued, with their technical training, with the broader 
framework of meaning within which their mentors placed it. ……….,its 
framework was self-consciously ‘modern’, isolated natural processes from 
human influence, interpreting the latter as inevitably ‘degrading,’ and 
arrogated to science the role of defining reality. It allowed no place for 
‘local’, ‘practical’ knowledge, devaluing the latter in favor of the finding of 
‘science’ (Crummey and Bassett 2003:12-13). 
 
Environmental policy and practice in Ethiopia is shaped largely by aid agencies and 
urban elites. The environmental policy of Ethiopia is not proactive and it is rather driven 
by external interests. Ethiopian National Conservation Strategy or National 
Environmental Action Plan has been developed through the World Conservation Union’s 
technical advisory role and the financial assistance of SIDA, ODA, UNESCO, and 
NORAD (NCS 1996 volume II, Keeley and Scoones 2003; 84, Mohamed 1999:6). The 
document comprises five volumes and it is claimed to be the first of its kind both in terms 
of covering multi-sectoral issues and in allowing a wide range of participation. The 
overall goal of the NCS is: 
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To improve and enhance the health and quality of life of all Ethiopians and 
to promote sustainable social and economic development through the sound 
management and use of natural, human-made and cultural resources and the 
environment as a whole so as to meet the needs of the present generation 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs (NCS II 1996:28).  
There is also clear statement in the conservation policy on the direct linkage between 
population and nature conservation. The policy stated that 40% forest cover of the 
country deteriorated particularly in the past three decades because of the fast growing 
human population. It further pointed out the relevance of the population policy objectives 
towards environmental conservation: 
Specific objectives of relevance to the NCS are:  
a  Making population and economic growths compatible and thus the over-
exploitation of natural resources unnecessary; 
b  Ensuring spatially balanced population distribution patterns with a view to 
maintaining environmental security and extending the scope of development 
activities; 
c  Improving productivity in agriculture and introducing off-farm non 
agricultural activities for the purpose of employment diversification; 
d  Mounting an effective country-wide population information and education 
programme addressing issues pertaining to the small family size and its 
relationship with human welfare and environmental security; and 
e  Maintaining and improving the carrying capacity of the environment by 
taking appropriate environmental protection and conservation measures (NCS II 
1996:25)  
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The document further elaborates on the environment and the impact of population growth 
by citing different studies and their estimated impact over the years if the overall increase 
in population growth is left unchecked.  
 
The policy also emphasizes the importance of local community participation in 
sustainable development and natural and cultural resource management. It advocates 
genuine participation of the community from project inception to the processes of 
monitoring and evaluation.  It states the importance of defining the distinct decision 
making power of the community, resources management professionals and government 
institutions in order to have a genuine local participation. But in the entire policy 
document, there is no definition of the power of the community and resources 
management professionals. The document defines only the power and responsibilities of 
the national, regional and local levels government institutions.  
 
The policy also indicates the importance of establishing community level environmental 
coordination committee and the need to have local community representative in the 
national and local environmental councils. The subsequent Forest Development, 
Conservation and Utilization Proclamation stress the importance of local community 
involvement: 
Forest development, conservation and utilization plans shall be formulated to 
allow the participation of local communities in the development and conservation 
and also in the sharing of benefits from the development of state forests 
(Proclamation NO 542/2007) 
It also recognizes the importance of local participation on the designation and 
demarcation of a state forest. Similarly, it emphasizes the priority of community’s interest 
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in accordance with rural land administration law, in times of conflict over designation 
and demarcation of state forest. In its section three article 9 sub article 8, it stipulates: 
Conditions shall be facilitated whereby inhabitants within a state forest shall 
continue living in the forest, while participating in the development and 
conservation of the forest, in a manner that shall not obstruct forest development; 
or, based on a study and in consultation with the appropriate body, they shall 
evacuate the forest area and settle in other areas suitable for living (Proclamation 
NO 542/2007). 
The participatory stance in the country policy agenda comes as   the result of increasing 
emphasis of participation in the international arena, the need to couch project plan in the 
language of participation and the 1990s local farmer resistance and destruction of 
conservation work (Keeley& Scoones 2003:87). One can clearly see, both in the 
proclamations and policy documents, the transition from the top-down framing to a more 
participatory one. For Example, the Conservation, Development and Utilization of Forest 
Proclamation No.94/1994, which is repealed by Proclamation No 542/2007, gave the 
Ministry of Agriculture absolute power over the demarcation and designation of state 
forest.  In its part two article 4 sub articles 5 it stated: 
If in pursuance of this article and article 7, the designation and demarcation of 
state forest, regional forest or protected forest is likely to result in eviction of 
peasantry, this can be effected only after the consultation and consent of the 
peasantry and subject to the assurance of their benefits (Proclamation 
No.94/1994). 
Unlike the 1994 proclamation, the 2007 proclamation stresses and calls for the 
importance of facilitation for the inhabitants in the forest to continue living in the forest. 
It also pushes for participation in the conservation and development of the forest.    
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1.2.1 Research Area 
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia has nine Member States, which are: Tigrai, 
Afar, Amara, Oromiya, Somali, Benshangul(Gumuz), Southern Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples, Gambela Peoples, and Harari Peoples. The Research area is located in the 
Southern Nation Nationalities and People Region (SNNPR).The region has a population 
of more than 15 million constituting around 20 percent of the country’s total population 
(CSA 2007). The region is divided into 13 administrative zones, 133 Weredas and 3512 
Kebeles. The SNNPR is the most ethnically diverse region of Ethiopia.  The languages 
spoken in the SNNPR can be classified into four linguistic families: Cushitic, Nilotic, 
Omotic, and Semitic, but the working language of the region is Amharic.  
 
The research area is located in one of the administrative zones called Wollaita. The Zone 
is sub divided by 12 Weredas.  The Wollaita zone is one of the SNNPR locations with 
high demographic pressure. According to Dessalegn (2007: 4), Wollaita is characterized 
by high population, poverty and destitution, limited urbanization, low level of rural 
livelihood diversification and frequent drought. In the years between 2003 and 2005, the 
regional government undertook resettlement measures in a bid to fight chronic food 
insecurity in the region. It was planned to resettle 40,000 households from Wollaita zone 
to other zones within the regional state (UN-OCHA 2003).  
 
Humbo Wereda
2
, the research site, is one of the12 Weredas in Wollaita zone. It is found 
in South Western Ethiopia, 420km South‐ West of the capital Addis Ababa. It has 125, 
441 total population of which 119,194 reside in the rural part of the Wereda (CSA 2007). 
The Wereda is multi-ethnic, Wollaita being the dominant group. Wollaita, Sedama and 
                                                          
2
 Wereda: is equivalent to District 
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Amharic are spoken as first languages by the groups. Agriculture is the main source of 
income for local communities in the Wereda. However, due to severe soil erosion, 
agricultural production has been negatively impacted. Maize, teff, haricot beans, 
chickpea, cash crops like coffee, cotton and the commonly consumed root crops are the 
main products in the area.   
 
According to Dessalegn (2007: 10), “Wollaita is a land of micro-holding,” holdings that 
are less than 0.5ha. According to the project document of WVE, most of Humbo farmers 
have 0.25 ha of land, which clearly indicates the fragmented nature of the landholding in 
the area. For Dessalegn, the land holding in the area is a   micro one which he defines as 
follows  
Micro-farm systems are those in which a household’s basic farm assets 
(Oxen, land, labor, and livestock) have become insufficient, and peasants 
become trapped in production for sheer survival. Such system cannot 
support the basic sustenance needs of the family, cannot create asset or 
reserves, and are highly fragile. They tend to easily collapse under even 
minimum pressure, such as for example a mild drought, limited rainfall 
variability, or moderate market fluctuation (Dessalegne 2007:10).   
 
Landlessness is also a major problem in the region, particularly for young people. With 
the growing young population, landlessness will become a significant problem in the 
region. The resettlement and the redistribution of communal land were also meant to 
address such issues in the region. Those who have micro-holding and who are landless 
usually survive through sharecropping arrangements (My informants, Dessalegn 2007). 
Actually sharecropping is done by both landless and the better-off as another way of 
income diversification.  
13 
 
The project with which this thesis is concerned started its operation in Humbo Wereda in 
2005. The overall goal of the project is; “ the sequestration of carbon in a bio-diverse 
native forest and contributing toward alleviation of poverty in the Humbo and Sodo 
districts with flow of benefits in the area of education, health and food security.”  (WVE 
2006, WVE 2007). The project is located in seven Kebeles of the Wereda: Abela Gefeta, 
Abela Shoya,Abela Longena Bola Wanche, Bossa Wanche, Hobicha Bada and Hobica 
Bongota Kebeles. The project area covers around 2,728 ha of degraded communal land.  
Humbo Wereda has diversified agro-ecological condition ranging from semi-arid (kola) 
to a tropical humid and sub-humid climate types. These varied agro-climate conditions 
made the area to be endowed with production of different commercial and food crops and 
diversified flora and fauna. 
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Figure 1:A/R CDM Project Area (PDD 2008) 
 
 
The project is the first A/R CDM project to be implemented in the country and the largest 
in Africa. It is a community managed forestry project working to rehabilitate the 
degraded forest through farmers’ managed natural regeneration mechanisms.  
International and local stakeholders are involved to achieve both the environmental and 
developmental objectives of the project. WVE and national, regional and local 
governmental offices are involved as partners. The farmers in the seven Kebeles are 
organized in to 7 cooperative societies to manage the forest. WVA is involved as a 
financer of the project. WB signed an agreement to buy half of the carbon credit that the 
project produced. Up to 2012, the community received the first round payment of 
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34,189USD. Based on the amount of the carbon captured the cooperatives share the 
payment, as shown in Table 1:  
Table 1: Cooperative Carbon Credit Payment Distribution 
Name of the cooperatives Forest Land size/ha Cooperative 
members in 2009 
Amount paid to the 
co/ USD 
Abela Longena Gaamo Salu Mt. Forest 
Dev’t and Protection cooperative 
society 
1043.45 820 12,138.123 
Hobica Bada Woito Mt. 372.77 735 4,623.524 
Bola Wanche Gamo Mt. 343.60 544 4,204.563 
Bossa Wanche Kacha Mt. 341.96 620 4,305.45 
Hobicha Bongota Oda Mt. 340.04 724 4,346.10 
Abela Gefeta Hoko Mt. 176.42 420 1,425.84 
Abela Shoya Sere Mt. 109.73 400 1,405.805 
 
1.3 Research Rationale 
CDM projects have been challenged by their twin objectives of achieving development 
needs of the host countries and global environmental problems. Ignoring one objective of 
CDM over the other means ignoring the trade-offs of such projects. The success of a 
particular CDM project depends on negotiation of trade-offs and inclusion and exclusion 
of groups on decision making processes regarding resource use and benefit sharing 
(McShane 2005). Projects that target long term global benefits of forest conservation are 
traded off against short term economic benefits. Developmentalists argue that the tangible 
benefits of current land use change outweigh the potential future benefits (Andersen et al 
2002). It is therefore important to understand the impact of global and local actors’ 
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interaction and competition in their bid to control forest resources to promote their 
differing interests in relation to the twin objectives of CDM projects.  
 
A CDM project involves global, national and local actors. The interest and expectation of 
these actors are different.  These actors have different levels of knowledge and capacity 
in terms of finance and technology, which will influence the project outcomes.  There is a 
clear power asymmetry among these partners which will impact planning and 
implementation. At the global level, the GHG aspects of the CDM have comprehensive 
review procedures that ensure offsetting quality and global institutional structure that 
specifically deal with GHG issues but yet few instruments for social and environmental 
sustainable development benefits. According to Gillenwater and Seres (2011), the 
contributions of CDM project towards sustainable development are difficult to assess 
until specific criteria are developed at the global or national levels.  
 
Since CDM objectives combine both the global and local interests for a single project 
outcome, looking at the everyday interaction of stakeholders will help in understanding 
the structural power at work. Such discussions are hoped to throw light on how local and 
global interests are negotiated, how decisions are made and which power in general 
seems to dominate in shaping the actions and interactions of actors that are involved in 
project implementation. Having as my objective to learn about the interactions and local, 
national and global actors in the project outcomes, I will try to answer the following 
underlying questions. 
What are the interests and expected benefits of the local, national and global actors?  
Who, how, and what determines access to forest resources in the project? 
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1.4 Significance of the research  
The Humbo afforestation and forest regeneration project entails global, national and local 
importance. Understanding the interaction of actors in the project will help identify 
opportunities and challenges that climate change presents for the twin objectives of 
conservation and enhancing the well-being of local communities. 
 
Understanding institutions and their role in achieving the twin objectives of local 
development and global environmental concerns can also help facilitate institutional and 
policy improvement at the national and local levels. It will also help the implementing 
organization to understand local perspectives on the project in particular and the forest 
resource in general. This research is also hoped to serve as a specific work for large scale 
comparative studies on the issue. 
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2. Research Method 
The research employed a combination of data collection methods including secondary 
literature review, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions with relevant 
authorities and local communities and participant observation. Secondary materials that 
include project documents, bylaws, letters and communiqués between the different actors 
are used and analyzed. Published and unpublished materials were also consulted to enrich 
the data from primary sources. 
2.1 Field Work Duration  
I have been in the field from June 20/2011 up to January 20/2012. My field work started 
from the national Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) for both securing research 
permit and accessing the policies and proclamations at the national level. Having 
established three bases; Addis Ababa, Sodo town and Abela Faricho, I spent seven 
months interviewing, reading and documenting corresponding letters, policies, 
proclamation and bylaws. 
 
Government being one of the actors in the project under study, there is a need to see the 
role of each level of administration from national to local ones.  As the capital and seat 
for the federal government, and also the base for national and international organizations, 
Addis Ababa is natural to be one of the bases for this research where I had my interviews 
with relevant subjects from the head offices of World Vision Ethiopia and World Vision 
Australia, and the World Bank. 
 
Sodo, the zonal town and less than 11Km away from the Wereda town of Tebela 
(Humbo), was a conducive and relevant place to be a center for my research. It is also 
where all zonal government offices are based. Availability of frequent bus transport to 
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Humbo town, better accommodation compared once again to Humbo town and its 
proximity to some of the Kebeles such as Hubicha Bongota, Hobicha Bada, Bola and 
Bosa Wanche made me choose Sodo over Humbo town. 
 
At Kebele level, my decision to base in Abela Faricho basically related to access to 
WVE/ ADP and its relative proximity to the three  Kebeles ;Abela  Longena, Abela Shoya 
and Abela Gefeta. There is no access road or transport system to get to the Kebeles. The 
local people in some of these Kebeles use motorbike commonly known as Bajaj. On 
market days, there goes one bus to some of these Kebeles . From Abela Faricho I often 
took a motorbike ride to get to the three Kebeles mentioned above. Being on the 
motorbike without helmet is dangerous enough. Add the recklessness and lack of 
experience on the part of the drivers, the decision to use them was clearly suicidal. After 
three scary rides to Abela Longena with the help of a WVE staff, I managed to get a good 
deal with one motorbike owner. I have physically been in four of the Kebeles; Abela 
Longena, Abela Shoya, Ablea Gefeta and Hobicah Bongota. For the others, I arranged 
cooperative executive bodies to meet me at Humbo town. And I covered all their 
expenses. 
 
2.2 Semi structured interview 
Methodologically, the thesis has adopted a qualitative approach. Informants were selected 
taking account of gender, with a view to especially access women - who are often 
differently affected by conservation projects. They elicit a different and often difficult 
story in relation to knowledge and involvement in the project formation, development 
and implementations.  Leaders and experts of the national, international and local 
institutions were recruited as informants. In the process, I made sure that the various 
interest groups have been represented.   
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From the international actors, I interviewed World Bank (WB) and World Vision 
Australia (WVA) representatives.  Informants from national to local level government 
organization who have been directly involved in the project both as implementers and 
regulators and World Vision Ethiopia (WVE) local and national experts and coordinators 
were also interviewed before and after my interviews with other stakeholders.  Out of the 
Seven Cooperative Societies, I was able to interview six of the executive bodies of the 
societies.  I also held an in-depth interview with 10 household members at Abela 
Longena Kebele. On market days, training times, and also through the collaboration of 
the Agricultural and Natural Resource Office Women’s Affairs Desk 20 individuals from 
six Kebeles were interviewed for more than an hour each. Five among the elderly 
members of the communities were also interviewed to obtain historical accounts. 
 
Wollaita and Amharic were used to interview the subjects. Depending on the situation, 
translators were also used. I had two translators, one for each of my two bases in the area, 
Abela Faricho and Sodo towns. The translators were selected based on their language 
skills, knowledge of the area and most importantly based on social acceptance. Some of 
my informants understand Amharic very well but they were more comfortable to 
communicate in their mother tongue while they still had control over the translation.  
Most of the interviews are recorded but when individuals were uncomfortable, I had to 
depend on my notes. 
 
At the beginning of my fieldwork, I was considered a journalist by the local community, 
because of my voice recorder and camera. But later, my informants came to understand 
that I am a student and do not represent government or non- governmental organizations 
involved in the project implementation. My informants seemed to have assumed that as a 
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student from Western University, I have better access and position to present their 
grievances both at national and global levels. 
2.3 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
Three focus group discussions were organized with various groups of the communities in 
order to obtain qualitative data as well as to validate and probe crucial points of already 
obtained data. I took advantage of events created by Agricultural and Natural Resource 
Office Women’s Affair desk to talk to a group of women who otherwise would have been 
impossible for me to organize. From their gatherings, I managed to get women from the 
six Kebeles under study and all but one were members of the cooperatives.   
 
One FGD was held exclusively with executive bodies of cooperatives. It was designed to 
have all the executive bodies of the cooperatives at Humbo town but only four attended. 
The other focus group is that of seven community members from Longena Kebele, which 
I used to validate the information that I got from individual HHs. 
2.4 Participant Observation 
I planned to attend national meetings, separate or joint, and review meetings at local 
levels. However, the review meeting with local stakeholders, usually organized every 
year, were not organized due to of financial constraints. But I was able to attend trainings 
and one local government evaluation meeting with the cooperative society which 
becomes part of my analysis. The training and evaluation sessions helped me observe 
interactions among communities and other stakeholders.  
2.4 Ethical Issues 
In the course of my fieldwork, I clearly communicated the purpose of my research for all 
my research subjects in a simple language that they can understand. I did tell them that 
participation in the research is purely a voluntary decision and that they could withdraw 
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whenever they wanted to. I made it clear that contributing to my research would not in 
any ways affect or compensate their role in the project activity. I guaranteed 
confidentiality of the collected information and also anonymity to some of my 
informants. It is not possible for me to provide anonymity to   those informants at the 
government offices and NGO experts even if I believe that it will have some implication 
for them. The problem is that even if I wanted to protect them, it is not possible to do so 
because it is not difficult to trace the experts and authorities in these offices based on the 
information I discuss. Therefore I did not promise to withhold their names and they did 
not ask for it either. 
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3. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
 
Governments all over the world realize that the continuance of growth depends on the 
availability of natural resources. This is clearly reflected in the Brundtland report in 
which they asserted: “We have in the past been concerned about the impacts of economic 
growth upon the environment. We are now forced to concern ourselves with the impact 
of ecological stress upon our economic prospects (WCED 1987:5)”. Since 1987, 
environmentalism has been couched in the language of sustainable development.  The 
ecological problem and Third World poverty have been merged in the 1987 Brundtland 
Commission Report and the 1992 Rio Declaration. Wolfgang Sachs (1992) argues that 
the main concern behind this merging process was not grounded in an overall concern 
about nature or the negative impacts that the growth paradigm had on poverty-issues. The 
merger rather mirrored the growing concern over the economic prospects for the future. 
 
The Brundtland Commission document defines sustainable development as:  
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987:43). To meet human needs was 
the central objective of development, and “meeting essential needs depends in part on 
achieving full growth potential, and sustainable development clearly requires economic 
growth…” (ibid: 44). It is obvious that economic growth involves a change in the 
physical ecosystem. The reconciliation between development and environment meant, in 
practice, that the importance of growth could still dominate and, as a result, ideas about 
non-growth were left out of the discussion.  
 
The issue of reviving growth gave emphasis to developing countries where economic 
growth, poverty alleviation, and environmental concerns are closely related. For a long 
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time, environmental problems have been attributed to the impact of industrial man, but 
later, with the spreading of deforestation and desertification, the poor become part of the 
equation. And they are identified as an agent of destruction. Theories within SD consider 
underdevelopment to be the cause of poverty and environmental degradation which 
necessitate development as a way out. Development seems, nevertheless, to be desired 
through increasing global integration, liberalization of trade and industrialization 
disregarding the historical and structural causes of poverty and environmental 
degradation (Sachs 1992:29).  
 
Economic growth and environmental protection are at the heart of the SD thesis. These 
competing objectives merge in providing a possible agenda to be achieved through 
technology and market fix. Science and technology being, in theory, objective and value 
free opened the way to technocratic solution for environmental problem. The scientific 
claim that established environmental hazards as a global problem also makes it possible 
for some actors to seek   global solutions (Sachs 1992:29-30). For SD, powerful interests 
and primarily representatives of nation-states are institutionally empowered to speak and 
act. “By definition, only international institutions and national government were up to the 
task in hand” (Hildyard 1993:25). And the assumed universal applications of market 
mechanism through internalizing external costs gained prominence in the international 
platform.  
 
CDM is one of the market mechanisms that are created to help developed countries 
reduce their emission through investment in developing nations.  In 1997, industrialized 
countries signed binding agreement to reduce their green house gases to the level of the 
1990 emissions but eased the task through emission trading, which is called “carbon 
offsets”. CDM is one of the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol/KP/.  The 
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majority of the developed countries (Annex I Countries)
3
 have become committed to 
target emissions through the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005.  
Countries agreed to reduce emissions of six greenhouse gases below the 1990 levels.  The 
Protocol sets specific emission reduction targets for industrialized nations. It provides 
flexible mechanisms for developed countries to achieve their commitment: Emission 
trading (ET), Joint implementation (JI).  It allows developed countries to invest in other 
developed and developing nations, which is counted towards its Kyoto target.  
 
CDM has dual objectives of cost effective emission reduction and promoting sustainable 
development in developing countries through technology transfer, capacity building and 
financial resource transfer (Kolshus etal 2001:1). CDM is presumed to be a mechanism 
from which both the investor and the host country benefits, a “win-win” situation.  CDM 
is a mechanism: 
 that assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development 
and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist 
Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3” (UN 1998 article 12 
paragraph 2:11).  
 
Behind the idea of CDM lies the economic principle of cost effectiveness, that the least 
cost options should be exploited where ever they may be located. Since cost effectiveness 
is the main focus of CDM, its priority lies more in GHG abatement than sustainable 
development of the host country. The Marrakesh Accord that sought to design a system 
affirms that the sustainable development aspect of CDM is the “host Party’s prerogative” 
(UNFCC 2002:20). According to Sutter and Parreno (2007:76), the trade- off between the 
                                                          
3 Annex I countries are defined as Parties to the Convention (UNFCCC) which are also listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 
These are the industrial countries and some of the countries with economies in transition (EITs). 
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two objectives favors the cost efficient emission reduction since there are no international 
sustainable development standards that could be an incentive to invest.   
 
According to article 12 paragraph 5 of the KP, a CDM project has to satisfy the following 
criteria: 
a) Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved;  
b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of 
climate  change; and   
c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the 
absence of the certified project activity (commonly known as the 
‘‘additionality’’ criterion) (UN 1998 article 12 paragraph 5:11). 
CDM projects include: energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, afforestation and 
reforestation, sustainable agricultural practices, reduction in methane emission, waste 
management, reducing emission of GHG from chemicals that are not part of the Montreal 
Protocol (UN 1998 article 2 paragraph 1a:1-2). 
3.1 How does CDM work 
At the international level: there are modalities and methodologies that are intended to 
systematically register, approve, measure and evaluate emission reduction. The 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(COP/MOP) has the authority over CDM. It is the higher body that provides guidance to 
the Executive Board. The Executive Board is fully accountable to COP/MOP and it is in 
charge of approving methodologies for calculating emissions reductions, maintaining a 
registry of projects, issuing CERs, and accreditation.  It has ten members: one from each 
of the five United Nation regional groups, two other members from parties included in 
Annex I, two from non-Annex I countries and one from the small island developing 
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countries. Members are elected to serve for a maximum term of two years. Designated 
Operational Entities (DOE) are accountable to COP/MOP through the executive board.  
DOE are the body that validate proposed CDM project activities, verify and certify 
emission by sources of GHG (UNFCC 2002:26-32). 
At the country level: Two things are deemed important at this level: the Designated 
National Authority (DNA) and voluntary participation. Designated National Authority 
(DNA) is responsible for approving any proposed projects and ensuring that they 
contribute to the country’s sustainable development. It is also responsible for confirming 
that the participants are involved voluntarily (UNFCC 2002:32).  According to 
Bhattacharyya (2011:628), the DNA can also be responsible for co-coordinating the 
formulation of sustainable polices, environmental and investment regulations. 
Furthermore, it can provide a guideline for national CDM project approval criteria, help 
manage risk associated to the CDM project and also help in promoting and marketing of 
this project. Since the SD activity of CDM project is given to the national government, 
there are no criteria or rules of procedure that ensure the CDM projects’ contribution 
toward sustainable development of the host country.   
At the project level: At this level the project design document (PDD) that strictly follows 
the modalities and methodology approved by the CDM executive body is given 
paramount importance.  And local stakeholders’ participation also gains status both in KP 
and Marrakesh Accord.  The Marrakesh Accord defines stakeholders as: “…the public, 
including individuals, groups or communities affected or likely to be affected, by the 
proposed clean development mechanism project activity” (UNFCC 2002:26). In the 
CDM project, participants include developers of the project that are responsible for 
developing the Project Design Document (PDD) and also in charge of monitoring the 
project. They can be government bodies, private sector entities, financial institutes, 
NGOs. There are also investors that purchase the emission credit (Bhattacharyya 
2011:629).The PDD must contain: the general description of project activity, application 
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of a baseline methodology ,duration of the project activity/crediting period, application of  
monitoring methodology/plan, estimation of GHG emissions by sources, environmental 
impacts, and comments of stakeholders. Meeting additionality and sustainable 
development requirement need also to be established in the PDD (Bhattacharyya 
2011:630). 
 
Many researchers argue that the technicalities of the CDM project are cumbersome and 
costly (Bhattacharyya 2011, Kolshus etal 2001, Paulsson 2009 and Gillenwater and Seres 
2011). To get verified CERs, the CDM project has to pass through a long process of 
auditing and verification. Since CDM depends on Market mechanisms, the burden of fees 
on administration and adaption will make it less attractive to investment (Kolshus etal 
2001:4). Gillenwater and Seres (2011) indicates the process by way of a chart: 
Figure 1:  CDM process and institution                                 
Stage one                                                                                                        Stage two  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 CDM and Forest Conservation 
As indicated elsewhere, the Marrakech Accord sets out the modalities and methodologies 
for CDM projects with the exception of those involving forestry projects. With regard to 
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the forestry projects, it restricts them to afforestation and reforestation undertakings and 
also sets a limit on their use in that it should not, “…..exceed one percent of base year 
emissions of the party, time five;”  (UNFCC 2002:22). Procedures and modalities of 
CDM A/R projects came into effect in 2003 at the meeting of COP 9 in Milan. Up to 
2006, not a single A/R CDM project had been approved because of the methodological 
problem (Haupt and Lupke 2007:2). For the forestry sector, CDM provides a financial 
and technology transfer from Annex I countries to support forest conservation in 
developing nations. 
 
Forest conservation is one of the most controversial areas of GHG abatement strategy, 
but it has a significant contribution of GHG emission into the atmosphere. The 
controversy of forest conservation very much rests on the socio-economic importance of 
land use and forests in general.  The opponent of CDM forest projects contend that they 
lead to a massive development of plantation or protected area and exclude the local 
community from forest benefits. There is also a dilemma on the implication of forest 
conservation on efforts toward permanent reductions in energy consumption. Issues 
related to monitoring, leakage and permanence have also created controversies (Paulsson 
2009:75). Under the KP, only afforestation and reforestation programs are eligible due to 
effects that might create permanent energy reduction and measurement difficulties for 
other undertakings. Forest protection was excluded from CDM and it was contested up 
until the meeting of COP 13 in Bali came into being. In Bali, however, a program called 
“Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation” was initiated with the 
hope that technology could solve issues of measurement (Cle’mencon 2008 cited in 
Paulsson 2009:75 Smith and Scherr 2002:2).   
 
The CDM A/R project has to provide the baseline and the project scenarios. The baseline 
scenario can be based on historical and existing (economic consideration or legal 
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requirement) carbon stock change, but the project owners can choose any approach that is 
appropriate for the case. The project scenario is basically the difference between the 
baseline and the project achievement through A/R activity, which is the net carbon stock. 
The actual net carbon stock is what is gained after deduction of the leakage (which is the 
emission caused by project activities, for example, from vehicles used to transport 
seedlings or from the shifts in grazing land because of the  displacement of grazing land), 
which is the actual tradable amount. CDM projects also need periodic monitoring of 
carbon stock, and, therefore, adequate monitoring and evaluation tools have to be in place 
(Haupt and Lupke 2007: 2, Kagi and Schone 2005:4-5).  
 
For a CDM A/R project to be eligible, it has to prove that the land has degraded or has no 
forest cover since 1982. Also there needs to be evidence that, either because of economic 
unattractiveness or without the income from carbon credits, the legal, technological and 
ecological barriers would not be overcome. There is also a need for the host country to 
ratify KP, establish a DNA and also set out criteria for sustainable development. The 
DNA has to confirm that criteria-based impact assessments be done for socio-economic 
and environmental implications, those including impacts on biodiversity and the natural-
ecosystem. If the project affects the socio-economic condition, a mitigation strategy 
needs to be designed (Kagi and Schone 2005:5-6, Haupt and Lupke 2007: 3).  
 
At this juncture, I believe it is important to identify what kind of forest protection 
activities CDM project may apply for. Smith and Scherr (2002:4) explicitly indicate the 
possible project type and how the carbon fund may be used accordingly. See Table 2. 
They indicate the possibility of A/R CDM project open to the development of plantation 
or protected area with the exclusion of local community. And at the same time it can also 
be stands for the benefit of local community through multipurpose forest management. 
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Table 2: A/R CDM Project type 
Forest project type  Approach Use of carbon payment 
Large scale industrial pulp 
or timber  plantation 
Establish plantation of fast-growing trees for industrial use in 
deforested and degraded area 
To cover up-front cost of developing new 
industry  
Agro-forestry, community 
forest plantation  
Increasing  tree-growing and forest cover on farm or associated  
non-farmed lands to supply tree products or ecosystem 
services( wind break, filter, strips, fodder bankes border 
planning ,woodlots, stream bank planting  
To provide technical and marketing 
assistance, to subsidies tree establishment, 
to pay farmers for carbon benefits 
produced, to increase local organizational 
capacity to manage and implement carbon 
contract 
Forest rehabilitation and 
regeneration 
Rehabilitate and regenerate severely degraded natural forest on 
community land or farms, to supply products and eco-system 
services; once regenerated, develop sustainable forest 
management system with local community 
 To provide training , local organization and 
planning to pay costs of forest protection 
and management to compensate users 
excluded  from regenerating forest 
Strictly forest protected 
area 
Remove potential threat of deforestation, and manage area so 
as to minimize human impact 
To compensate sources of deforestation 
threat,. To pay costs of forest protection, to 
develop  income sources outside protected 
forest, to reduce leakage 
 
Multiple-use community 
use within protected forest 
Remove potential threats of deforestation and developed 
sustainable  forest management system with local communities 
(timber, NTFPs
4
, hunting, ecotourism) within the protected 
forest 
To compensate sources of deforestation 
threat, to develop local technical business 
capacity for managing  protected forest 
Source:  Adapted from Smith and Scherr (2002) 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
  NTFPs: Non-timber forest product 
32 
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
        4.1 Political Ecology 
During the course of my fieldwork, I found out that political ecology is very important 
for the problem at hand. Its particular emphasis on actors at each level, from local to 
international institutions, and  the focus on marginalized groups, makes it relevant for my 
research focus in general  and research findings in particular.  Owing to its focus on the 
political ecology of actors, it also addresses issues of power by exploring how the relative 
power of actors is negotiated and exercised in competition for resource access and use. 
These elements, therefore, make political ecology relevant to my research. 
 
According to Paulson et al (2005:28), all kinds of human interaction have political 
elements that are used to secure differential access to resources through a differential 
level of position, knowledge base and representation. He further indicates that political 
issues encompass everyday life interactions.  Different actors represent different interests, 
and hence each will likely promote their own agenda. Bryant and Bailey (1997:25) 
emphasize that the interaction of actors is the very bits and pieces of politics.  Political 
ecology uses the basic tools of political economy in analyzing social relations of 
production and questions of access and control over resources in order to understand an 
environmental problem. However, there is a wide variety of approaches in political 
ecology. 
 
Agrawal (2005:210) classified these varieties of approach of political ecology into three 
thematic groups.  The first one is the focus on social marginality and access to resource. 
The second one is the desire to study the political cause and effect of resource allocation. 
And the third relates to the underlying attention given to the cultural, socioeconomic and 
political contexts that shape the human use and control of resources. Schubert (2005:17), 
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on the other hand, provides us with his own distinct categories of political ecology 
approaches: 
 “a post-structuralist, mostly deconstructivist approach that questions predominant 
discourses of environmental change and policies; 
 the analysis of concepts of ‘people’ and ‘nature’, mainly the analysis of gender as 
a constructed category interactions and  
 Defining a more rights-based body of research concerned with questions of 
access, rights, entitlements and environmental justice.” 
 
Also Bryant and Bailey (1997: 21-24) come up with five approaches.  The first approach 
is placed in understanding the human impact on the physical environment within the 
political-economic perspective. The second approach attempts to understand how 
discourses are developed and used to promote specific interest of actors. The third 
approach is concerned more with regional variability. The fourth one is an approach 
which sees environmental questions in the light of socio-economic characteristics, class, 
ethnicity, or gender while the fifth approach puts emphasis on the interest and actions of 
the different types of actors in understanding political- ecological conflicts. 
 
All classifications of political ecology approaches seem to agree on the centrality of 
examining social structures at various levels and the analysis of actors, their interest and 
discourses that they develop and promote in a bid to access natural resources. Robin’s 
(2004:12) definition of political ecology summarizes almost all the classifications 
provided above: 
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As critique, political ecology seeks to expose flaws in dominant approaches to the  
environmentally favored  by corporate, state and international authorities, working  
to demonstrate the undesirable impacts of policies and market conditions, 
especially  from the point of view of local people, marginal groups, and vulnerable 
populations. It works to ‘denaturalize” certain social and environmental 
conditions, showing them to be the contingent outcomes of power, and not 
inevitable. As critical historiography, deconstruction, and myth-busting research, 
political ecology is a hatchet, cutting and pruning away the stories, methods, and 
policies that create pernicious social and environmental outcomes.   
 
Despite its wide use and acceptance, political ecology is criticized for overemphasizing 
politics and underemphasizing ecology. Some argue that the field become so politicized 
and is carried away with social sphere with insufficient focus on ecological system. The 
power struggle over resource access and representation takes central stage while the 
environmental aspect receives little attention (Mulder & Cooppolillo 2005:176, Walker 
2005:78, Bryant &Bailey 1997:6).  
 
In our world, people are sharply divided by differentials of power, knowledge, 
technology and wealth, and the decision and actions of some have more value than 
others. Due to disparities of resource possession, some benefit more than others. And not 
all knowledge or technologies have equal footings. It is important to stress the fact that 
the existence of a wide asymmetry of power does not mean that all powers are 
independent; all power relations manifest autonomy and dependence. There is equally the 
need to recognize that even the weak actors have some power (Bryant and Bailey 1997: 
25). How and why the unequal social and political power affects both environment and 
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people's livelihood is what political ecology seeks to understand. In doing that, political 
ecology looks into how knowledge and technology are at the service of the powerful. 
  
According to Wolf (1990:592), power is concerned with producing and sustaining one 
version of truth against another potential truth. And this truth is produced and sustained 
in the form of scientific discourses.  Throughout this thesis, power is presented in the 
context of structural power, which, according to Wolf, is: “…the kind of power that 
shapes the social field of action so as to render some kinds of behavior possible, while 
making others less possible or impossible” (Wolf 1990:587).   
 
To understand how power manifests itself, one has to understand the mechanisms of 
power, the point it touches individuals’ ways of thinking, actions and everyday lives 
(Foucault 1972:59, 93). Foucault argues power works at the level of desire and 
knowledge. It enters and forms the social interaction through the production, 
accumulation and circulation and functioning of discourse.  
Production of environmental intervention is intimately connected to the 
production of environmental knowledge, both of which are intrinsically 
bound up with power relations (Guthman 1997:45 cited in Bryant 1998:88).   
 
This shows that the construction of environmental problems and their solutions by 
powerful actors is very much an act of politics that may or may not have scientific 
backing. In various developing countries' soil-loss crisis that is largely blamed on 
mismanagement by local people is developed based on uncertain and ambiguous 
evidence (Thompson and Warburton 1986: Ives and Messerli 1989: Tiffen etal 1996: 
Rocheleau etal 1995: Zimmereer 1996; Guthman 1997 cited in Bryant 1998:88). Scholars 
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like Sachs (1993:20) argue that environmental problems have become a matter of 
Northern security. Therefore “……a higher level of observation and intervention has to 
be installed, in order to control the consequences of the control over nature”. Escobar 
(1995) uses the term “colonization of reality” and explains how “certain representations 
of reality become dominant and shape indelibly the ways in which reality is imagined and 
acted upon”. By taking Foucault’s insights, Escobar sees how the dominant discourse 
“produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even making 
others impossible” (Escobar 1995:5).  
 
The strength of political ecology as an analytical framework for my research objective 
relates to its particular acknowledgment of the battlefield of power and knowledge when 
the various actors engage in accessing natural resources. There exists a wide range of 
divergent as well as overlapping values when different group exercise natural resource 
management and use. It is important to look into and understand the formulation, 
negotiation and implementation of rules, procedures and laws in order to understand how 
different actors try to legitimize their action. Understanding of relationships of actors 
requires analysis of the implication of competing representation of the global and the 
local for physical landscape and livelihood. By taking political ecology as my analytical 
tool, I hope to describe the relationships of the various stakeholders that are involved in 
implementing the A/R CDM project in south western part of Ethiopia.   
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5. Who Owns Humbo Forest?  
The question of ownership in this study is a very interesting and controversial one. The 
legally recognized owners
5
 of the forest resources claimed that the land has been taken by 
the state and that the state is now the owner of the resource. In this chapter I will try to 
address who the owners of the forest are:  When does an ownership claim become an 
issue? Why do the communities have a counter claim on the legal entitlement? What does 
owning the forest mean to the various stakeholders?  
 
5.1 Land Tenure in the research setting 
As the main basis of the national economy, the legal entitlements of land have passed 
through lots of changes. Since land tenure is not the main subject of this study, I will not 
go through those historical developments, but I will briefly discuss the federal and 
regional laws that stipulate access, control and transfer rights of rural land
6
.  In Ethiopia 
ownership of land is vested in the state and the people. The current land tenure system 
allows private, communal and state ownership. According to the rural land proclamation 
private land means the land that is given by law for individuals to have the right to use 
the land. Any citizen of the country who is 18 years of age and wants to engage in 
agricultural activity has the right to get rural land.  Communal land in Ethiopian legal 
context is the land given by the state to local community for grazing, forestry and other 
social services. In the same proclamation communal land stated to be transferred as a 
private holding depending on the necessity. State land holding refers to forest and 
wildlife protection areas, state farms, mining lands, lakes, rivers and other rural lands that 
are not held by individuals or communities (Proclamation No.456/2005).  
                                                          
5
 Ownership in Ethiopian legal contexts means the right to use the resources from the land, or what is called 
usufruct right.  
6
 The land rights referred to here is only in regard to rural land and does not represent the urban land tenure 
system in the country.  
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In the Federal Proclamation, individual land holders have the right to rent out part of their 
holdings and transfer his/her holding right to any family member. It also provides the 
regional government comprehensive rights on redistribution of holdings and its 
administration. Regional states would enact their own land administration and land use 
laws within the frameworks of the federal law.  The regional states
7
 determine the 
minimum size of holding, for example in the research area of the SNNPR, the state 
determined the minimum size to be not less than 0.5 hectare per household. Under this 
proclamation the regional state has the right to establish new institutions for land 
administration, which in practice is the rural Kebeles
8
 and agricultural bureau. 
 
It is important to see here how communal land holding and land conservation treated in 
both the federal and regional legal frames operate. Both the federal and regional laws 
recognize the right of the community to use communal land for socio-economic 
activities. Especially the regional law clearly states that the rights of the community to 
have communal land for grazing, social and cultural affairs are reserved.  In both these 
legal documents the usufruct right of the community has conditionalities. The 
conditionalities relate to the constitutional rights of citizen access to land, governments 
developmental projects, and environmental issues that are related to soil and forest 
conservation. The regional law for instance states that:  
Privately unoccupied land as well as lands under the possession of 
community or government which are potential for agriculture shall be re-
                                                          
7
  This regional law is the Southern Nation Nationality and People state/SNNP. 
8
  Rural Kebeles are the lower level of administration in the country. They are organized so that they are 
responsible for addressing social, economic, political, and even judicial issues.  
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allocated to landless youths and peasants who have less farmland 
(Proclamation No.110/2007 article 13 sub articles 3).     
Article 3 of the Federal land and article 5(sub article 14) of the Regional Proclamation 
clearly indicates the power of both levels of the state to deny any claim related to 
communal land by stating that the government, as the owner of all the rural land, can 
transfer communal holdings to private holding whenever it is believed necessary to do so. 
Later in this chapter I will discuss how the interpretation of such law creates a conflict 
situation in the research area. Article 9 (sub article 4) of the regional proclamation also 
indicate that the state can transfer communal possession to landless youth and peasants: 
“privately unoccupied land as well as lands under the possession of community or 
government which are potential for agriculture shall be reallocated to landless youth and 
peasants who have less farmland.”  
     
The other conditionality relates to the soil and land management. The regional 
proclamation has elaborated articles under section 3which determines the proper use of 
steep slope, gully and wetlands. The articles under this section determine the 
management of rural land based on its slope: for instance any rural land with the slope 
more than 60 degrees only be used for tree plantation and forage production. Such lands 
are not allowed for crop plantation or for free grazing. Sub article 7 stated land that is 
steep slope and degraded shall be protected from human and animal contacts until it is 
rehabilitated. 
 
The regional proclamation also provides responsibility of implementation, coordination, 
establishment of institution at different levels and establishes a better system of rural land 
administration, upon the regional bureau of agriculture and rural development. The 
regional, zonal and Wereda level agricultural bureaus are the ones that involve in the 
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project activities, which will be discussed throughout the chapters regarding government 
involvement, and partnerships both with the local community and the local and 
international nongovernmental organizations. 
  
5.2 Who owns Humbo forest? 
Who owns Humbo forest is the question I kept asking the various stakeholders involved 
in the Clean Development Mechanism project entitled “Humbo community managed 
natural regeneration project”. All stakeholders involved, except the local community, had 
the identical answer; they claim that the local communities are the owners, but the local 
community disagreed on such an assertion. For them the land was taken by one of the 
stakeholders, that is the state. They know that they are the owners on paper but for them 
ownership means more than having the legal right on paper. It is more focused on access 
rather than the legal entitlement. One might ask, what is the difference between owning 
the resource and accessing it?  It seems once you have the legal right, it is practical to 
have access right. In the case of Humbo forests, accessing the resource is determined by 
other rules and regulation which seem to have less to do with the community interest and 
expectations. 
 
The start of the community managed natural regeneration project brings with it issues of 
ownership of the communal land in the project area. Before the project started up, 
ownership was not an issue of concern for the local community, even though they did not 
have legal documents to show for it. According to the local community, what gave them 
secure ownership was free and unregulated access to the resource for generations.   
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There is, however, a widely held prophecy which is of interest for this study. This long-
standing prophecy concerns change in land ownership in the project area. The local 
community believed that the prophecy would come true in the name of a conservation 
project. The prophecy has an elaborate explanation of how the land that has sustained 
social and economic needs for generations is taken by the most powerful authorities that 
the local community has no bearing on. Most believe that this powerful authority is the 
national government. Some of my informants say the global government, which comes 
by the name of World Bank, is the one responsible in taking that land away from them; 
the World Bank as a financer involved in this project. I will come back to the details of 
its involvement later in the chapter. In this prophecy there is a warning for the local 
community to look for alternative food sources, since they no will longer have the 
privilege of eating meat and dairy products. 
 
For generations the project area has been grazing land, a land that most depend on in 
times of crisis, like drought, and it is a source of income for so many. Most youth pay for 
their education by working on this land, particularly during their summer vacation. This 
land has a special relation when it comes to women. Like all individual residents in the 
seven Kebeles, women generate income from the communal lands by making charcoal or 
selling firewood. For them this income is such that the husband has no control over or 
knowledge of it, so that basically, it is a source of independent income that they can buy 
anything with. Women in the area also have medicinal knowledge which is useful in an 
environment where modern medicine is a luxury. Traditional doctors in this area treat 
both humans and animals.  While I was doing my fieldwork I asked about traditional 
doctors in all the Kebeles, and what fascinates me most is that women are the only 
practitioners of traditional medicine. I was able to talk with three of the practitioners who 
explained what losing access to the forest means to them;  
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Even when selling charcoal and firewood was cheap, we used to earn more 
than 20 to 30 birr ($1 to 2USD) per week. Now, when there is a price hike 
every day, we could have benefited more than we used to. Now-a-days a 
single sack of charcoal has a market value of 100 birr ($6 USD). One can 
produce more than a sack in a week time, depending on the number of able 
persons in the family. We are also forced to sell our goats, fearing the 
penalty placed by the cooperatives in the event of the goats found inside the 
forest. A single goat has a market value of 1000birr ($57 USD). From the 
forest we not only have income, but our health and the health of our 
domestic animals depended on it. So we are losing every aspect of our way 
of life because of this particular project. We used to help cure a sickness 
that is even difficult for modern medicine to cure. Now we do not have 
access to those medicines (WK2)
9
. 
 
In a community where more than half of the total population is considered food 
insecure
10
 losing even a small portion of land or any sort of sustenance has a detrimental 
effect. According to the Wereda agricultural bureau report half of the total population in 
the Wereda own less than one hectares of land. Adding climate variability in the region, 
most farmers live in a constant struggle to feed their families all year round. The area is 
prone to natural disasters like drought, cyclically every three to five years. So the forest is 
one of the coping mechanisms that the communities have used since the 1970s. 
 
                                                          
9
 For the sake of my informants’ general wellbeing, I agreed to ensure their anonymity. In the place of their names 
I use a simple letter coda which describe their sex and the role they have as an informant: WK= Women Key 
Informant, with the number used to differentiate one informant from another one.  
10
 According to the Wereda agricultural bureau report 69,872 individuals from the total population of 125,441 
receive aid under the safety net program.   
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For most small holders the forest means an alternative income resource, in addition to a 
pasture for their domestic animals. For youth and the landless, the forest provides a 
source of hope and sustenance while they await the opportunity to be a land holder. As I 
indicated at the start of this chapter, communal lands are for redistribution to landless 
farmers when the need arises. Forests are also the only energy resource that villagers 
have for cooking and keeping the house warm. Forests contribute 70 percent of the 
energy demand in the country (Damel 2001:5). Collecting firewood takes most of the 
women’s and children’s time, apart from fetching water. The farther the forest areas from 
the villages, the more burdened the women and the children will be. An increasing 
scarcity of firewood not only affects families’ time but also children’s schooling. 
Research done by the Ethiopian Development Research Institute indicated that “a 50 
percent increase in collection intensity reduces the likelihood of child schooling by 
approximately 12 percent” (EDRI working paper, 2012: VI), with girls as the most 
heavily affected group. The forest also provides the basic materials that the villagers need 
to build their house and storage places.  
  
Access to the forest for farmers has a different meaning than for the other project 
stakeholders. For the community, use values of the forest are more relevant, unlike the 
environmental values which the other stakeholders value dearly. According to the non-
community members of the project owners, the project provides wide varieties of 
opportunity than the non-project period. The project provides better pasture, reduces soil 
erosion and flooding, maintains the supply of water sources, and increases the 
agricultural productivity and income stream through sustainable management of forest 
resources. 
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The project objectives and what it is in practice managing to show as outcomes are 
successes that any observer will appreciate and acknowledge. The question, however, is 
how the other main stakeholder, the community, looks at it? What does it mean for them? 
And what does it cost them? By looking at how, what and who determines access to the 
forest, I will try to answer such questions.  
5.3 Institutional Arrangement  
It is best to begin by describing who is who before analyzing the details of the everyday 
activities and interactions of the different stakeholders within the project. 
5.3.1 National, Regional and Local Government Institutions  
Ethiopia has a federal system of government composed of nine states and two city 
administrations which are delimited on the basis of settlement patterns, language, and 
identity. Power is decentralized through administrative arrangements that transfer 
responsibilities from federal to a local level of decision making. The key government 
institutions consist of line ministries and bureaus at the federal and regional levels 
respectively. The regional bureaus are further decentralized to Wereda and Kebele levels. 
In this particular project, bureau from federal to the lower Wereda level are involved both 
as partners and regulatory bodies.  
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Figure 2 .Power structure of the country  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mehrete (2002:137) 
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of interest is one of the guiding principles’ when it established these institutional 
frameworks. Practically, however, it seems there are conflicts of interest and it becomes 
obvious in the regional bureaus and farther down the line. For a long time, and still now, 
the presence of agricultural and natural resource bureaus both in the regional and local 
level are strong when compared to the newly established environmental bureaus
11
. There 
have been frequent restructuring in the region to give the environmental office a better 
structure and independence. The recent restructuring in the region established 
environmental department within the agricultural and natural resource bureau. And at 
zonal and Wereda levels, environmental issues are part of natural resource department 
within the agricultural bureau. I believe the frequent restructuring and confusions of 
responsibility have a negative effect on the office implementation and regulatory 
capacity. From all the interviews that I had at all levels of the government bureaus; I 
learnt that the environmental protection authority, the regional, zonal and Wereda levels, 
the agricultural and natural resource bureaus have no network of information exchange 
whatsoever. Information networks function only at the Wereda and zonal levels. The 
regional bureau has more of a symbolic presence when it comes to this particular project, 
and had been represented in meetings and training sessions at the project start up time.  
 
The Environmental Protection Authority at the federal level, which houses the 
Designated National Authority (DNA), was involved from the very inception of the 
project. The office is in charge of assessing the contribution of the project to the 
sustainable development strategy of the country. It is also expected to issue letters of 
                                                          
11
  When it comes to the region, the status of environmental bureau is confusing even for those who are part of 
the structure. There has been frequent restructuring that comes with new names and status. The status of 
environmental office changed from office to department or desk within agricultural and rural development. When 
it comes to the zonal and Wereda level there is no such distinction, as it is part of agricultural and natural resource.  
SO when I use ‘environmental desk’ it refers to the regional, and when I use the ‘agricultural and natural 
resource bureau’ it refers to Zonal and Wereda level structures.   
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approval based on its assessment. The authority is also expected to have regulatory role. 
This applies particularly to the development aspect of the project, since the host country 
was made sovereign to decide whether or not a CDM project activity contributed to the 
sustainable development of the country.  
 
The authority has environmental impact assessment and CDM document approval criteria 
that focus on the economic, social and ecological aspects of a project.  In both documents 
socio-economic and ecological aspects are given due emphasis. The environmental 
assessment document gives focus on health, natural and cultural heritages, gender, 
participation, and issues of access to both forest product and other infrastructures in more 
elaborate manners. But the approval criteria are vague and simplistic, unlike the impact 
assessment criteria which are more thorough. 
 
When it comes to access to the forest, the approval criteria specify two indicators; impact 
on access to natural resources and impact of the project on energy costs. But the 
document did not provide any methodology for looking at such impacts or how to 
measure such an impact in general. In the Project design document (PDD) access to the 
forest are discussed, but there is no mention what the cost of energy might be, or if there 
will be any cost at all. So how the DNA decided on such matter remains vague. During 
my interview with Derge Agonafe (Yeakababe Ahidoche directorate director), He stated 
that the DNA revised the document according to the stated sustainable development 
criteria, which focuses on economic, social and ecological aspects. From the listed 
sustainable development criteria I found only one that related to people’s interests (the 
rest are focused more on pollution and ecosystems safeguards):   
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That negative impacts on the environment and on people’s environmental 
rights be anticipated and prevented, and where they cannot be altogether 
prevented are minimized and remedied (EEA 2004:2). 
The office has not done any evaluation since 2006 to check whether the project has been 
done based on the PDD or not, nor did they speak with the local community, or even to 
the regional and Wereda level bureau before issuing letters of approval.  What the 
director believes is that - whatever is in the PDD and its implementation - the local 
community is better off with the project regardless. The source of such optimism 
regarding the project outcomes comes from the premise that the reforested area is 
severely degraded to the point that no one gets anything out of it. The authority basically 
left the issue to be addressed by the NGO and there is a priori understanding that socio-
economic problems which come with the project intervention can be addressed by WVE 
other aid programs.  It is important here to bring in Crummey and Nelson’s (2003) 
description of Ethiopian elite’s attitudes towards farmers: “Ethiopian elites perceive 
Ethiopia farmers to be, to a considerable extent, agent of their own misfortune.” They 
believe that if the community is left alone there will be more disaster and degradation.   
  
The regional environmental desk does not even have a copy of the project document. 
They do not have any knowledge as to what is going on at the ground level and had 
limited involvement during the project’s inception.  One of the staff at the regional 
bureau has the responsibility and he is the only link to this project, though even now, he 
does not have any established network with line sectoral offices. He claims to have been 
involved from the very inception of the project, but he has never seen any project 
documents and he does not have any knowledge of his office’s responsibilities as one of 
the signatories of project implementation. 
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According to the 1995 general guidelines of transitional government of Ethiopia,
12
 
sectoral offices have to be involved in the planning and implementation of any 
development program spearheaded by any NGO.  The guideline gives sector offices the 
power to reject a proposal if it does not conform with the local development plan. So for 
any NGO working at the regional level to be able to register and sign implementation 
agreements with the regional Finance and Economic Development Bureau, they needed a 
cosigner from a responsible government organization
13
.  In this particular project the 
regional Agricultural and Rural Development and Land Administration and Use and 
Environmental Protection Authority was a cosigner.   As a cosigner of the project, the 
office has responsibilities which in any case do not involve financial commitments. The 
regional bureau is on the top of the ladder, and it can delegate the responsibility to Zonal 
and Wereda level line office and follow the progress from there. But in the case of this 
project, the regional office did not establish any links with the line offices. I was told by 
the Bureau head, Ato Abera Mulate, that when the regional office has limited information 
on such an issue, no one will expect the line offices to have full engagement because the 
regional office did not provide them the resources and the technical capacity to do so.  
 
At the Zonal and Wereda levels, two government organizations, the Bureau of 
Agricultural and Natural Resource Development and the Bureau of the Cooperative 
Society Promotion each played a significant role during the project development and 
startup. However, they have internal weakness that relates to structural, financial and 
                                                          
12
  In 1995 the transitional government of Ethiopia formulated a general guideline for the implementation of the 
national policy on disaster prevention and management; which has guideline on NGOs operational system and 
how they establish and maintain relations with the national and local level government offices in the country.  
 http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:2932  
13
  Recently the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development both at the national and regional level has the 
responsibility of registering and monitoring all NGOs that operates within the country. It used to be the mandate 
of the disaster prevention and preparedness commission and later the Ministry of justice.  
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technical capacity which limits their involvement to the point that the NGO sets the rules 
of engagement. 
 
The Zone and Wereda Agricultural and Natural Resources offices are over-loaded with 
the daily routines that relate to agricultural extensions, land rehabilitation, food security 
and other land rights related issues. So the follow-up of project commitments that the 
bureau has with non-governmental organization is not a priority for the day-to-day 
routine.  They did, however, have a clear understanding of the project and were involved 
from the project start-up phase, still; the bureau involvement is supervised by the NGO.  
Whenever demands arise from the main project owners, in this case World Vision 
Ethiopia, the bureau responds in a positive manner. The government’s Agricultural and 
Natural Resource experts are involved as a data collectors and trainers throughout the 
project periods. The bureau also issues letter to the community and other sectoral offices 
whenever the NGO finds it necessary to do so through government offices.     
  
The other line office that has a stake in this project is the Cooperative Society Promotion 
Office, which has the responsibility for organizing and regulating cooperative societies. 
This bureau is established by the Federal Cooperative Communion Proclamation, 
Number 274(2002). The Commission as the other ministerial institutions has its line 
bureau in the region and at the local level. The establishment of cooperatives has a long 
history and passed through different political and economic conditions of the country. I 
will talk about the history of cooperative development a bit later in the chapter. 
 
The National Cooperative Society Proclamation 147(1998) of the country conforms to 
the Universal International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), Cooperative Principles and the 
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International Labour Organization (ILO) promotion of cooperative recommendation 
(No.193/ 2002). It outlines the legal framework for registration, the role and 
responsibilities of the legally recognized cooperatives members, management, privileges, 
audit and inspection, and also cooperative dissolutions. 
 
The Cooperative Commission Bureau played an important role in the formations of seven 
Kebeles farmers’ cooperatives, which were established to manage the forest. It has the 
responsibility of auditing the cooperative society account and also supports them in 
matters of legal issues, which needed legal representation in the court of law. The bureau 
is constrained by lack of financial and human resources, and infrastructural problems. 
Nevertheless they made an effort both in terms of organizing and regulating the various 
cooperative in the area.   
 
In the light of all the political and administrative structures just described, one might ask 
about the degree of autonomy of the offices at various levels of the structure. 
5.3.1.1 Who has power in the government structure? 
Many have argued that despite regionalization, the current regime has centrist tendency 
and there exists little form of local governance. Despite having constitutionally defined 
power and responsibilities, regional states have limited power on issues of local concerns 
(Meheret 2002, Aspen 2002, Keeley& Scoones 2003, and Berhanu 2007). 
Constitutionally the regional states are made responsible for executing economic and 
social development policies, strategies and plans for the region, establishing and 
administering a regional police force, and maintaining public order. The constitution 
added further responsibilities stating that all powers that are not given to the federal 
government are reserved for the states (FDRE, 1995). Research done on the issue 
indicates that the extent of central government interference in the regions varies based on 
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administrative and institutional capacity, sufficient local resource base, and  the adequacy 
of trained man power  in the regions.    
… the regional context increasingly matters in some cases, offering more room for 
maneuver, and the opportunity to reinterpret and transform policies coming from 
the centre for the local context. In other cases, by contrast, political and 
bureaucratic constraints appear to limit such opportunities, resulting in less 
flexibility and fewer attempts at local adaptation of centrally derived policies 
(Keeley& Scoones 2003:92). 
 
According to Keeley &Scoones the history of interactions between people and the ruling 
party matters when it comes to political participation and political independence within 
Ethiopian regional frameworks. According to them, because of such reasons, the SNNPR 
top-down stance is often that the rules are applied in contradiction to Tigray regional 
states, which was a key player during the struggle for liberation.  In his 1999 review of 
the regionalization, Young stressed how the ruling party runs things in the southern 
region in order to have strong control over the political process: 
…unlike their counterpart in Tigray, cadres selected to administer the south 
typically have low levels of education, frequently appear to be motivated by 
opportunism and, not surprisingly, have questionable legitimacy among 
their constituents. Weak leadership gives rise to accusation of theft, bribery 
and incompetence, and these charges are given at least some credence by 
the frequent changes and short tenures in the office of many leading 
officials in the region (Young 1999:198). 
Frequent restructuring and lack of stability have played a significant role in undermining 
the power of the state.  Such instability created in some way a safe environment for the 
NGO and companies in general to adjust things to their own ends. For example, during 
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the project start up, the NGO wanted to finalize the certification of the cooperative 
formation in order to get the paper ready for international approval.  The normal 
procedure was to get temporary registration paper for the first year and based on the 
evaluation of the year performance permanent registration certificate will be issued. This 
is done, not only because it is standard procedure, but also because so many cooperative 
created by the NGO happened to phase out with the project. So the expert demanded that 
WVE follow the normal procedure, but WVE did not want to wait a full year. What they 
did instead was to call up on the political elites to a three day meeting
14
  and get the 
blessing there directly, by-passing the system. Even though there are problems to be 
solved from the point of view of the experts, the NGO got the creation of the 
cooperatives approved by the political assignees.  The Humbo forest project being 
approved centrally, along with the fact that the Prime-Minister Melse Zenawi is taking a 
significant role in international and regional climate change agenda, made the project 
unique and politically more sensitive than the government’s own land rehabilitation 
programs which had similar purposes. 
 
 Another means of central government influence over regional states comes with the lack 
of separation between party membership and state administration. Aspen (2002) and 
Meheret (2002) in their studies of regionalization of the country clearly indicates that the 
local councilors and administrator see their roles as the representatives of the central 
government and the party, rather than of their electorates. Another manifestation of the 
top-down character of Ethiopian political structure is also the financial dependency of the 
regional state on the federal government. According to Meheret (2002) the regional state 
receives 83% of their revenue from the central government. 
                                                          
14
 According to my informant the political elites were provided with a satisfactory amount of money under a  per 
diem from the NGO. According to him, the NGO provided them 6 days worth of per diem while they were only in 
the venue for three days.  After the meeting, the experts were told that they stand against the national 
development agenda and told to issue the certificate.   
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Despite having all the legal and political power to influence the project outcome, all the 
local governmental offices are paralyzed by structural instability, political, financial and 
bureaucratic constraints, and a lack of confidence on the part of experts and authorities 
because of the regular public political evaluation system of ’gim gima’15 as well as 
insecure and uncertain political positioning. 
 
5.3.2 Multilateral Institution and Non-Government organizations 
 5.3.2.1 The World Bank 
The role of multilateral institutions in developing countries’ political and economic 
affairs has been the subject of academic study for long now. They have been subjected to 
increasing scrutiny, especially after the Asian financial crisis. Predominantly, the 
financial institution of the World Bank as the single largest creditor to Third World states 
has “garnered the lion share of the public critics” (Bryant and Bailey 1997:87).  The 
financial institutions exert a considerable power over Third world states because of their 
ability to influence the flow of both private and public money from the developed world. 
According to Bryant and Bailey, the Bank’s power is coming not only from its role as 
bank but also from its ability to influence the development path of third world countries 
over the decades (Bryant and Bailey 1997:88).  
 
One of the critiques of the bank is its indirect influence over third world environmental 
degradation. As financer and planers of the third world economic development, the Bank 
                                                          
15
  Every employee is subjected to a review when any person outlines their criticisms of performance in a public 
hearing. The proponent of such system argues that it encourages openness and increases motivation and 
performance. On the other hand critics of this system point out the way in which the system encourages 
conformity and often involves intimidation. See Keeley and Scoones (2003) for more.  
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is thus somewhat responsible for the environmental crises that these countries are 
suffering. The Bank is criticized for the conditionalities imposes on the borrowing state 
without due consideration of internal circumstance and perspectives which result in 
increasing economic and social problems. Continued replenishments of loans effectively 
reduce many developing nations to powerless states, dependant on the so-called ‘charity’ 
of the Bank and its twin, the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  World Bank funded 
projects are also criticized because of their ignorance of social, human and environmental 
cost (Nath 2000, Bryant& Bailey 1997). 
 
In its new role as global climate change financial planner, the Bank has also caused much 
controversy. The Bank is facing an increasing resistance from civil society organizations 
to limit its role related to the Green Climate Fund (GCF). In 2011, more than 50 NGOs 
and global civil society networks wrote a letter for UNFCCC Secretary and members 
warning against Bank’s role in the GCF. The Bank’s role in extractive industries, its 
continuing investments in polluting industries, its undemocratic governance structure 
dominated by developed nations, and the privileges given to the private sector pointed out 
by the organizations letter point to the Bank’s many weakness and ultimate inability to be 
considered an environmental bank (Craynest and Streatfeid 2008, Brettonwoods 
project.org 2011).  
 
The World Bank has played a role in the Ethiopian economy and environmental 
rehabilitation programs since the 1950s. The Bank has played an important role in 
supporting agricultural expansions and resettlement programs in the country.  The area 
studied in this thesis is one of the recipients of the World Bank supported ‘comprehensive 
integrated development program’ since 1970. The program promotes both agricultural 
expansion through increasing access to modern inputs, and land conservation through 
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bund building, gully control and large scale afforestation programs. Infrastructural 
development and resettlement schemes were also part of the project (Dessalegn 2007). 
 
The Bank’s involvement in the particular project with which this thesis is concerned is a 
bit different from the other Bank engagements in the country. According to the project 
team leader of the Bank, Edward Felix Dwumfour, the Bank’s involvement is purely 
business, to buy the carbon sequestered because of the project. The Bank signed the 
agreement with World Vision Australia and World Vision Ethiopia to buy some of the 
carbon for the next 10 years at a price of $4USD per ton of carbon. The Emission 
Reductions Purchase Agreement for this project was signed in November 2007. 
 
The Bank also helped finance the upfront cost of the project and help build the 
monitoring capacity of the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and also the 
capacity of World Vision Ethiopia, primary project proponent. Dwumfour expressed the 
Bank’s interest in this particular project is more to secure experience in carbon financing: 
It is a learning period. Gathering experience and lessons to scale up and 
replicate. I guess also to pilot test carbon financing. Start off, start small, 
start in an African country, I mean the continent did not benefit from CDM 
because of the cumbersome nature of CDM framework. Do it and see how 
that works and if there are challenges and gaps in the framework we will be 
able to submit revisions (Dwumfor, WB environmental expert). 
Even if the Bank claims it is a business deal, at the same time it is clear that the Bank is 
very much involved in shaping the project portfolio to pass through international criteria 
to be able to secure accreditation.  It provides and pays for the technical support and 
expertise that is locally inaccessible. 
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5.3.2.2 World Vision Australia 
World Vision Australia is a Christian organization that engages people to eliminate 
poverty and its causes. The organization works in five continents and about 60 countries 
focusing on relief and development projects. The Humbo forest project is part of a 
portfolio project that World Vision Australia does with World Vision Ethiopia. It 
provides financial and technical support throughout the project period. Dean Thomson, 
Commercial and Compliance Advisor of World Vision Australia, stated that the interest 
and involvement of the organization is part of the organization’s development project in 
helping the local community to get additional income flow from the carbon market.   
 
World Vision Australia is involved in a carbon project in Peru before Humbo, so it has 
the experience and the expertise in the area of marketing and also on the verification 
processes that the project has to pass through in order to get the accreditation requisite to 
be involved in the carbon market. World Vision Australia was one of the Project entities 
up to 2009, but in 2009 the validation mission found that the fact that Australia has not 
instituted a structure for administration of CDM projects, technically disqualified World 
Vision Australia from participating as one of the proponents for such project (WBE, 
2009). So now the organization remains to provide the financial and technical support 
needed in order for the project to achieve its goal. 
 
5.3.3 World Vision Ethiopia 
World Vision Ethiopia opened its national office in Ethiopia in 1974.  From it 
establishment up to the 1990s it focused on relief and rehabilitation programs. Like any 
other NGOs in the country since 1990s, World Vision has changed its program direction 
towards development assistance. Currently the organization has 68 Area Development 
Program Offices (ADP) in six regional states and a head office at the capital city Addis 
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Ababa. It also provides emergency assistance when needed throughout the country, and is 
engaged in collaborative projects outside the six regional states in which it has offices 
and projects. The organization of their national programming involves sponsorship, 
education, child protection and participation, health and nutrition, water, sanitation and 
hygiene, agriculture, economic development, income generation, access to market, 
etc(National office strategy 2010). 
 
World Vision Ethiopia started its relief work in the project area, Humbo, in 1970s.  Since 
then the organization has been doing both development and relief assistance in the area. 
The community in the research area is quite attached to the organization activities in one 
way or another. The research area is regarded as a drought prone area, so World Vision is 
involved both in the distribution of relief assistance, the distribution of food-based safety 
nets, and food security related aid. According to Dessalegn (2007:50), World Vision 
Ethiopia had spent 12 million USD in Sodo and Humbo ADP from 1999 to 2006. 
 
Like other NGOs in the country, World Vision Ethiopia seems more successful in relief 
distribution than the development assistance that it has claimed to work on since 1990s.  
The organization is still providing relief assistance for the same people that it claims to 
provide development assistance, so people in the area have been involved both in the 
relief and development programs of the organization, and thus they have developed 
strong attachments and respect for it. Compared to government organizations, World 
Vision is more accessible to the poor, stable in their structure, more flexible and efficient, 
and they work to promote a participatory approach.   
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World Vision Ethiopia, like any other NGO in the country, is constrained by an 
unfriendly policy environment. It introduced itself to the community through its 
emergency work and was seen by the community as an “aid giver” and so it has been a 
challenge for World Vision and others who had the same engagement to change their 
role.  
The relationship between NGO and their beneficiaries is still informed by 
the notion, if not reality, of “aid giving” which makes the tasks of the 
organizations quite difficult. Many initiatives to enable peasants and their 
communities to take over responsibility for managing health, water, savings 
and credit schemes have failed as a result of this  ( Dessalegn 2007: 56).   
Like government institutions, all NGOs including World Vision Ethiopia, particularly in 
their ADP, found it hard to attract and keep high-caliber staff.  Its engagement in 
economic development, particularly of agriculture, naturally led the organization to 
integrate environmental issues at the heart of all programs. Land degradation is the major 
problem in the country which World Vision engages in, with land rehabilitation programs 
in most ADPs. Involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism is an opportunity that 
no one in the country was aware of until WVA came with the idea and expertise.   For 
both the WV organizations involved in this project, poverty reduction and natural 
resource conservation remain their main priorities.  
 
5.3.4 The Seven Community Cooperatives  
The seven community cooperative societies were formed for the purpose of this particular 
project. The project is aimed to rehabilitate a communal land area that, it is claimed, has 
neither formal nor informal institutions that can represent the community or manage the 
resources in question.  The claim is that the idea of cooperative formation comes during 
community mobilization.  In some NGO reports, there exists an indication that 
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government officials at Wereda level suggested the idea of cooperatives society 
formation.  Wherever the idea came from, cooperative society formation in the country is 
not new and has been trained within the NGO environment for some time now. In 2006 
there were 6004 Primary Agriculture and Allied Cooperatives in only rural parts of the 
country (Veerakumaran 2007:5). 
 
There are three well known traditional cooperatives or self-help groups in the country, 
Edir, Eqube, Debo, which each has a different form and strength in different cultural and 
ethnic groups. Since 1960 the modern form of cooperatives started in the country and 
their formation and development has changed with the political and economic 
transformation of the country. Excessive government intervention during the socialist 
regime contributed negatively to the development of cooperatives in the country. After 
the collapse of the regime in 1991 some cooperatives were looted by local people for 
their assets (Yuka 2007:2). Cooperatives were used for political purposes and there are 
still state-controlled ‘pseudo-cooperatives’ in the country. There were many failures that 
made both farmers and some elite groups skeptical about cooperative formation after the 
regime change and liberalization of the country economy. It is appropriate here to cite 
what cooperatives mean to Wollaita farmers’: 
To the surrounding peasantry, socialized enterprises, particularly 
cooperatives, were a threat, a burden, or unwelcome competitors for 
resources…peasants were compelled to work on them during ploughing, 
weeding, and harvesting but were not paid for their work, and on occasions 
they were expected to meet their own expenses if the work lasted more than 
a day (Dessalegn 2007:36).   
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In 1998, the activities of farmers’ cooperatives were formally revived by the Cooperative 
Societies Proclamation No. 147/1998. The proclamation defines that cooperative 
formation is a voluntary action and that they participate in the free market economic 
system. The proclamation also outlined the organizational structures of the cooperative 
which have four layers; primary cooperatives, Union, Federation, and cooperative 
leagues.  
 
The regional proclamation for the establishment of cooperative was issued in 2007, with 
Proclamation no. 111/2007 further elaborating the regional context upholding the federal 
law. In its Guiding Principles, it states that a cooperative society has to be:  
1. Voluntary and open membership 
2. Democratic member control 
3. Member economic participation organization 
4. Cooperative societies are an autonomous and independent democratic organization  
5. Giving Education, Training and information 
6. Cooperation among cooperative societies 
7. Concern for community’s sustainable development 
The seven cooperative societies established in the project area have taken the form of the 
primary cooperative society. They have their registration certificate from the sector office 
and now have a legal identity and also a user right over the communal land. 
 
All these cooperatives were established by fulfilling all the needed criteria to be 
registered cooperatives. They have offices, bylaws, internal law, name and address, 
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including shares of their members, and bank accounts. The organizational structure of 
each cooperative have:  
 General Assembly; composed of all members of the society and it is the highest 
decision-making body of the society. The assembly elects the Chair, Vice-Chair, 
Secretary, and Cashier of the Executive Committee. 
 Executive Committee; composed of seven members which are accountable to the 
General Assembly 
 Internal Control Committee: composed of 3 members to be elected by the General 
Assembly and accountable to it. 
 The societies establish sub-committees accountable to the executive committee to 
undertake specific functions for the purpose of managing and protecting the 
demarcated reforestation area: in all the cooperatives there are audit, forest 
development and forest guarding committees.  
All these were cooperatives established with the objectives:   
 To undertake reforestation and conservation activities of the area designated as 
forest land within the locality   
 To mitigate the degradation of natural resources and climate change in the 
designated area and restore the natural balance by planting indigenous tree species. 
 To ensure that the development, protection and conservation of the reforested area 
is carried out under the full control and active involvement of the community 
living around the area. 
 To improve the livelihood of the members of the society by promoting investment 
and saving culture within the community. 
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 To encourage sustainable forest management and natural resources conservation. 
 To ensure that members share the responsibilities and the benefits from the 
reforestation of the designated area. 
 To increase forest cover in the community managed areas and ensure improved 
forest condition. 
 To use the income derived from the reforestation project to meet the various 
development needs of the community. 
Establishing formal institution to take the management role of the communal land was 
one of the major tasks during the project startup phase. It was not an easy task, having to 
consider issues of property, massive numbers of claimants to the particular resources, and 
the bad reputation of previous cooperatives in the country.  A concerted effort by the 
NGO and sectoral offices staff made it possible, but was there true community 
participation? This is the question that I am trying to answer based on the interviews I 
conducted with members of the cooperative, non-members individuals, and executive 
committee members. 
 
5.4 Partnership and Participation 
The community in the project area was involved, and it is still consulted in some matters. 
But the question that I am trying to address here is what does partnership and 
participation mean in a country like Ethiopia? What does it mean when it involves state 
apparatus and multilateral institutions like the World Bank? And whose opinion matters? 
As Harrison (2002:587) notes “Development ‘partnerships’ obscure a wide range of 
inequalities, but the ability to define the terms of the debate is one of the more subtle.” 
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When we talk of participation and partnership of the various groups we tend to ignore the 
differences of power dynamic and asymmetry between the partners. As Harrison 
indicated above, the power to define the terms of the debate is often ignored while 
discussing participation and partnership. The history and culture of the given society also 
matters here. Ethiopia’s long standing hierarchical and non-participatory state apparatus 
needs to be taken into account when we talk of partnership in general and participations 
in particular. In Ethiopia, participation becomes a form of public relations to create 
greater institutional legitimacy. Both state and non-state actors’ claim to promote a 
participatory agenda, but one has to analyze the political processes in order to understand 
its true meaning.  
 
All adult Ethiopians have passed through one or two oppressive regimes in their lifetime. 
The country has never experienced democracy in its true sense.  The regime in power 
currently claims to be a democratic one, but both its practices and research indicates 
otherwise. For instance, Vestal (1997) states that “several commentators argue that the 
present government has not relinquished the dictatorial tendencies of the Derg
16
, and 
continues to stifle free expression” (Vestal 1997 cited in Harrison 2002:599).  It is 
important here to consider communities memories of the past regime and the current state 
practice when we talk of participation and partnership. 
 
When I started my fieldwork, I was naïve not to have had remotely appreciated the 
political sensitivity of the project, or for that matter, any project that relates to 
environmental conservation. After a couple of weeks in the research area, it became clear 
how closely things were associated to politics.  The opposition group is considered 
relatively strong in this region, compared with others; not because it is more powerful but 
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 The socialist regime that rule the country from 1974-1991 
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because of its relative stability over time. Due to such leverage of the opposition, people 
can easily be labeled as members of the opposition for simply expressing concerns on 
issues that matters to their livelihood. 
Whether it is the state or the NGO, expressing our opinion is difficult now 
since everything is political.  When the disadvantage outweighs the 
advantage of expressing opinion, the majority prefer to hold their thoughts 
to themselves. We prefer to live in peace pretending that we did not hear or 
see anything (M1: Bossa Wanche).   
Another informant from Longena cooperative says: 
 We knew cooperatives during the Derg period too. We were divided into 
Kebeles and told to form a cooperative and so we form a cooperative.  
When one refuses not to be part of the cooperative, he becomes an outcast. 
Because of this I am now a member of the cooperative. I do not want to be 
an outcast. We do not want to live alone. How can we live without people, 
can we live in the forest? We want to live with people (M2: Longena). 
Apart from the influence of past experience on present decisions of people, these excerpts 
show that the political environment in the country is not conducive for people to express 
their concerns freely, and show that people still live in fear of the political repercussion of 
their opinions. Some members of the cooperative join in order not to be seen as being in 
the opposition. Still others might join because they believe there are benefits, while some 
join because of the promise that has been made to them. 
 
In the beginning of the project period in 2006, a massive community mobilization was 
conducted. From the lower Kebele to Zonal administrators were involved in the 
mobilization process. In most of the Kebeles, the administrators were the ones who 
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chaired the community conversation and later even became the heads of the cooperatives. 
From the community perspective, the state focused on educating them through 
Development Agent (DA) for about a decade to become more strict in matters of 
environment, and no one can do anything about it except to submit to their power.  
Community members talk of being powerless in the face of the state, but they did not 
give up without a fight. They strive to keep what they believe was theirs for generations. 
There were different forms of resistance such as planting own trees within the project 
border, removing the newly planted seedlings, poaching wood and fodder on a large 
scale, especially during the night. Such resistance activities still persist today. Recently 
there was an attack on one of the guards at Longena Kebele and massive distraction of 
forest at Bola Wanche in 2010.  
 
The farmers’ resistance in one of the Kebeles’ named Hobicha Bongota is worthy of 
mention. Large numbers of people were marching towards the cooperative offices 
shouting and menacing leaders of the cooperative. The cooperative leaders had to run 
towards the Kebele office for help but the mob was too aggressive and significant in 
number for the Kebele officials and guards to contain. So, both the cooperative leaders 
and the Kebele officials, as they said, had to run for their life. WVE and Wereda 
administration and police force were later at the scene. According to my informant, 
around 15 community members were taken to prison – those who were identified by 
cooperative leaders and officials of the Kebele as the architects of the protest. The 
community suspected leaders of the cooperative of collaborating with the Kebele 
administration to sell their lands to foreigners (MK3, M4, and W5). 
 
According to Scott (1985:28-35) when an open protest results in grave measures, like 
confinement on the part of the state, the resistance may restore to slowdown and take a 
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less dangerous forms of resistance.  In a country like Ethiopia, where there is no 
democratic culture and institutions, people resort to the safest way of showing their 
discontent.  In addition to poaching in the forest, they express their dissent through oral 
poetry, jokes and ‘back talks’ (i.e. talking behind people’s back rather than confronting 
them). According to my informant, sometimes the back talks get them some attention 
from WVE. For example, WVE responded to complaints about lack of benefits by 
organizing paid training sessions, which had a calming effect for a while. 
 
Around 2007, during the actual project area demarcation and closure, claim over 
ownership of land inside the forest become a controversial issue. There exist different 
opinions on such claims. Some people, most notably WVE staff and some officials in the 
agricultural bureau, believe that the claimants do not have legal ownership of the land 
and their claim is simply based on traditional ownership. They further stress the issue as a 
politically motivated scam on the part of the individuals. The other groups, court 
officials, and community members argue that these individuals have a legitimate claim 
over the land but they failed to invest on it. Having this difference of opinion, those 
individuals have taken the matter to the courts. The court at the lower level decided in 
favor of some of the plaintiffs (those who had certificates of ownership and receipts of 
tax payments). The Kebele appealed to the higher court and at this stage the cooperatives 
rather than the Kebele became the defendants because ownership of the resource had 
been transferred to them. The higher court decided against the plaintiffs for the reason 
that they never had any investment on the land since it was allocated to them by the state 
in 1988 EC 
17
(1995).  
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What made the higher court decide against the plaintiffs is a controversial matter. There 
exist two opinions about the decision among the experts and the community in general. 
One group said that the court decision is unbiased and it was a right interpretation of the 
law. The second group believes that the court decision is biased and not supported by 
conclusive evidence. As discussed above in the land tenure section of the chapter, the law 
states the possibility of ownership transfer from communal land to private land. Most of 
these farmers have ownership certificates and tax receipts and are, by law, entitled for 
ownership of the land. The lower court sent experts to the villages so as to substantiate 
the claims, and based on this, the court decided against the Kebele.   The higher court 
reversed the decision, and this also relates to the rural land Proclamation. The regional 
Rural Land Proclamation in its section three “rural land restrictions” states that: 
When any land user leaves the land uncultivated beyond the time limit 
given by the competent authority without sufficient reason, he shall lose his 
right of using the land. Details shall be determined by the regulation 
(Regulation no 66/ 2007:10) 
If the higher court claims to use this law then one could argue that it should also refer to 
the regulation which states the conditions for losing ownership. Since the Kebele never 
warned the farmers about not investing in the farm either orally or in written form, it may 
be said that the court does not have conclusive evidence to rule against the plaintiffs:  
Any rural land user shall not negligently let fallow his land more than two 
consecutive years. After the Kebele administration approves the land is not 
ploughed it shall give oral warning with Kebele land administration and use 
committee together with local elders. Then, if it is not ploughed after six months, 
the Kebele administration shall give written warning for the next six months. Still, 
if it is not done based on this warning, he shall loose his use right. However: 
a) He is sick or put in prison, 
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b) There is no land tiller due to death of his family member 
c) Drought, flooding and other natural calamities occur, and 
d) When rural land user face problems and accepted by the Kebele 
administration, he shall not lose his rural land use right (Regulation no 66/ 
2007:11). 
The court appears to follow the law but without having conclusive evidence to support 
whether owners invested on the land or not. But then, why rule against the farmers? 
Could there be any underlying sources of pressure?   
 
After the lower court ruling, WVE wrote a letter addressed to various government offices 
from Wereda to Zonal levels including the court, stating the project’s global and national 
importance. The letter stressed the significance of the project to the nation development 
in general and the future generation in particular. It emphasized how such a project could 
turn to dust because of the ignorance of insignificant number of individuals: 
…in the mean time, a handful few people who lack understanding of the 
ongoing development undertakings have undermined the benefits that the 
project provides for the society and future generations, and claimed land 
ownership in the project area. They took their case to court and, 
unfortunately, the court decided in their favor. When they engaged in some 
illegal activities, they were made to refrain from their actions by the 
Wereda Administration and the Wereda Agriculture and Development 
Offices…At the same time, the Bola Wanche cooperative society appealed 
to Zonal court (WVE letter no/62/2002 EC).     
In the letter the organization calls up on all the government offices to follow the court 
procedure and discuss the matter with pertinent authorities. The question here is, can this 
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letter have had an impact on the court ruling?  The letter has persuasive power if one 
looked at it in the context of the country’s economic and political directions. The letter 
pointed out two important issues; first the development of the country and second, the 
majority interest being put on hold because of an ‘insignificant number of individuals’.  
These two points have precedence over any individual interest if we look at it in the 
constitution and other proclamation and policies of the country. Whatever the influence 
of this letter may be is a matter to be left for debate, but the action of WVE here is my 
discussion point. Whose interest is it that WVE is protecting?  Is it not part of the CDM 
to protect people’s right to resources? I will come back to this when I discuss NGO and 
donor relations. 
 
How did WVE and the sectoral offices manage to establish seven cooperatives through 
all this resistance and controversy? 
As a responsible Kebele administrator, I used both my administrative power 
and my skill to convince people. I had to get more than 300 individuals to 
sign as cooperative members. At the beginning the resistance was tough 
and we tried to convince people by telling them of the benefits of the 
project. We told them that they will get money by selling carbon, as well as 
plant seedlings and through trainings. And we told them that the 
organization will support them…As an administrator I told them that we 
and our individual interests are not above interests of the state and I said to 
them, you do not need to interfere in matters of politics. The state will not 
bring something that will harm us. If we protect the forest we benefit from 
it (M8). 
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This excerpt shows how the administrator uses his power in order to subdue the 
resistance of the peasants and to get them on board. Such deeds lead us to question 
whether there has been any participatory planning that secured community consent and 
ownership. In this particular project, the use of intimidation was applied in almost all the 
Kebeles. When I have raised the question in three of my focus group discussions (FGD)
18
 
they unanimously and explicitly say there was intimidation. They stressed that the 
resistance in the beginning was very hard to contain, so that the Kebele administrator 
used intimidation and at some point, with the collaboration of the police force, 
individuals were detained for more than 15 days (as noted above). They believe that 
detaining some members, especially those who were considered to have their own 
independent ideas and take initiatives to act as such, would be a lesson to the rest of the 
community. 
 
The answer to one of my question for WVE/ADP staff clearly shows how the institution 
through government networking uses intimidation of local people to enlist collaboration: 
There were an insignificant number of people who created chaos within the 
community. They were mobilizing the community and troubled all those 
involved in the project and stood in the way of project implementation. By 
identifying those people with the collaboration of the community, a 
corrective lesson was given to them. Prisons play a corrective role, isn’t 
that true? (Kebede Regasa, forest officer)     
            
This issue has a different interpretation when asked to officials and experts at the sectoral 
offices. The answers focus on the level of community knowledge and awareness on 
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were with women from the 6 cooperatives and one FDG with 6 Household at Longena. 
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issues of environment and land degradation. Since the community is regarded as ignorant 
of what is happening to the environment and to its livelihood, it is the government and 
the NGOs that have to play a corrective role. According to government officials, all the 
things the local administrator did were for the good of the community and the future 
generations, because all the community thinks about is the daily basis. This line of 
argument is also shared by World Vision experts both at the level of ADP and the head 
office. 
At the beginning, the local community thought that World Vision and the 
government took their land; they did not understand the development that 
the project brings to them. What they know was somebody will take the 
land and invest on it, they do not understand that the project activity is an 
activity that changes their environment. First of all, the carbon market is 
scientific, it is difficult for them to understand and this is the reason for 
their resistance. The other thing is that the community thinks they will lose 
their right to land, another reason for their resistance (Addisu Zekiwose; 
ADP coordinator). 
 
On the part of the experts, there is a tendency to attribute every concern of the 
community to lack of knowledge. During my fieldwork the communities, including some 
of the executive members, were talking about how their farms are affected by wild 
animals and they claim that in some of the villages there was even an attack on little 
children. The community argued that because of the project, the number of wild animals 
is increasing and they are coming closer to the villages. They claim that more than ever, 
they have to guard their farms day and night. A family owning a farm closer to the forest 
claimed that half of their farm products destroyed and eaten by baboons, warthogs and 
bush duikers. Women are especially afraid of the ever increasing number of hyenas in the 
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village, more for the life’s of their children. Hyenas have always been in the villages, but 
now they are coming out from the forest before the sunsets.   
 
The response of the NGO experts was surprising.  They said the community’s claim was 
unfounded and impractical because the change they claim that the project brings in the 
forest provides the wild animals the necessary fodder to stay in the forest. They did not 
check whether there is some truth in what the community says. For both government and 
NGO experts, the community is seen as a group of ignorant individuals who needs to be 
coached in order to improve their own life situations. For both, participation of the local 
community is a criterion that they need to fulfill for donors sake or a way that they 
channel their top-down planning. It is also the way they enlisting labour participation 
from the community which takes part in planting and pruning activities in the forest.  
5.5 Are the cooperatives autonomous entities? 
The cooperatives are registered under Ethiopian law as independent entities. They have 
institutional hierarchy that shows the power structure of their organization having the 
major power reside in the general assembly, which includes all members of the 
cooperatives. They have bylaws and internal laws
19
and have a usufruct right over the 
communal land. Membership registration and selling of shares are their basic means of 
finance.   
 
As the initiator of such an establishment, the support and guidance of WVE started from 
the very beginning. They supported in building their offices and in providing office 
equipment. They have been, and are still, providing capacity building training both to the 
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  Bylaw: the bylaw is a general law that focuses on the structure and membership criteria.  
Internal –law; is in this case unwritten law that more focuses on rules and regulation of access to the forest. 
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leaders and members of the cooperatives on issues directly relevant to the project; forest 
management, conflict resolution, financial management and planning, income generating 
activities, and to the far more distantly related HIV and AIDS issues. The issue here is 
questioning whether these trainings do help build their capacity to be able to manage the 
forest, or will they still remain dependent on WVE support and guidance? WVE readily 
give the answer to this question by saying that the cooperatives are now independently 
running the project and going to form a union of seven cooperatives.  But the day to day 
practices of the cooperatives show a different picture:  they are obviously dependent on 
WVE. 
 
When I was in the field, the Zonal cooperative promotion office conducted performance 
evaluations of the seven cooperatives following WVE’s request to form a union of the 
seven cooperative societies. I attended the last evaluation meeting at Hobicha Bongota 
society. During the evaluation
20
 the two members of the evaluation team established that 
the independence of the cooperatives is questionable for reasons that they found in the 
cooperative documents and also from the interviews they had with all executive bodies of 
the societies: 
 Community mobilizers (employees of WVE) have been chairing meetings of the 
cooperative societies. 
 The existence of limited knowledge among the executive bodies of the 
cooperatives about their bylaw and objectives. 
 Their failure to genuinely represent the interests of members. The team found out 
that the leaders are hiding the problems that local community faced because of the 
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 After attending the evaluation meeting I had interviewed one of the members of the group. So the information 
here is both from the interview and the meeting.  
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project. A case in point is the threat that wild animals have posed to the 
communities. 
 Their complete dependence on the guidance and supervision of the NGO etc… 
 
To start from the cooperative formation, their bylaws were produced and provided to 
them by other institutions; which the cooperatives say is WVE. WVE on the other hand, 
reported it to be the WB.  To quote one of their reports:  
Accordingly, draft bylaw and internal law of the cooperatives society was 
produced by WB and the Amharic version was discussed, commented by 
the special group selected from the community so that their comments are 
incorporated and presented to the whole user group members for final 
comment (WVE 2006:9). 
Here in the 2006 WVE report, WB is the one who produced the bylaw. According to 
Dwumfour, WB environmental expert and team leader, this is not true. On the other hand, 
he has the Amharic version of the law, which he had difficulty in understanding what it 
is. From his project visit he had learned that the cooperatives are the one who developed 
the bylaw. Cooperative promotion office also believes that they developed and own the 
bylaw because it is important that they did and the Cooperative Establishment Law 
requires that it should be the case.  Another problem with the bylaw is that most of the 
executive bodies of the cooperatives have a limited knowledge of it. For instance in the 
article 17 sub article 2, it states that more than 10% of the member of the society can call 
an extraordinary general assembly. But WVE through agricultural office can call 
extraordinary meetings whenever they find it necessary for them without the support of 
10% of the members.  For example, in 2010, to replace the cooperative leaders of Bossa 
Wanche, WVE use the agricultural office to call the meeting because they suspected that 
cooperative leaders were involved in forest distraction activities that happened the same 
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year (WVE letter No 51/2002). Similar meetings were also called for different purposes 
in different societies. 
 
On the other hand, cooperative leaders and members have a good grasp of the internal 
laws that are not even in written form. According to the information I received, all the 
cooperatives have no written version of the internal law. During the interviews with 
community members concerning the subject of access, they always raised grievances 
about the amount of fines they have to pay for trespassing. When I asked the community 
who decided on the amount, they replied that they themselves created it and yet they are 
suffering from it. Most of the community members agreed to the fine believing that it 
would restrict all members equally, and they also relied on the information that the 
restriction for grazing would only last until the trees grew to a certain level. At first, the 
amount was set to 5 birr ($0.28USD). When some members of the community decided to 
graze their animals in the forest and pay the fine, the executive committee decided to 
increase the amount, but with consultation of the members. In most Kebeles the fines are 
now 20 to 50 birr which is equivalent to $1.10- 2.80 USD. In one Kebele, Abela Shoya 
cutting trees and sending animals to the forest is a sufficient reason to send somebody to 
prison for a day and also 50 birr ($2.80 USD) fine. Such measures were never agreed up 
on by members and WVE in general, but it used to be practiced by all cooperatives in the 
beginning (MK3, M5, M6, M7 and MK8).    
 
Since I do not have the opportunity to look into the internal law, I do not have details of 
the law on how, what, and who determines access to the resources. I depend solely on my 
interviews with the executive bodies of the cooperatives. According to cooperative 
leaders, permission to access resources depends on the availability of grass, the season 
and demands of members. Since demand on the part of the cooperative members is 
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always there, demands that are created because of the dry summer season are the one that 
receive positive responses from the cooperatives, but WVE is the one who ultimately 
determines access to the resources. According to my informants when WVE 
communicates with the cooperative leaders to allow members to cut and carry the 
grasses, the leaders will allow members to buy a one or two birr pass and cut whatever 
amount they can. In the event of fire risk, farmers are allowed to cut grasses without 
restriction. WVE also has to call upon the cooperatives or the agricultural offices to 
organize community labour for coppicing and pruning, and then members are allowed to 
collect the cut back branches of trees for firewood. The availability of firewood for the 
community depends when coppicing and pruning are needed inside the forest. When it 
comes to firewood and animal feed, the community has to rely on other alternatives such 
as far away forests, crop residue, their own farms, and animal waste etc. The very 
interesting contradiction to note here is that the communities do not want to do the 
pruning and coppicing work without being paid. WVE has pointed this out as one the 
challenges for the project implementation (WVE plan, 2011). These are not the only 
places that the organization interferes and imposes its interests. What I am about to 
discuss below will also makes us question where the interest of the organization lies 
when it comes to this particular project.  
 
In 2009, WVE called upon the executive committee of the cooperatives for training and 
asked them to come up with annual development plan. All the seven executive 
committees came out of the training having the same development plan: to build a store 
house, which they are going to use as a store and a shop for the grain market, and a mill 
house.  Why all seven cooperatives planned to build the exact same thing leads one to 
question what happened during and after the training.  
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The executive members of each cooperative were told to discuss the plan with the 
community and they did. In all of the cooperatives, the community did not like the idea of 
investing the money in business activity which they say, would mainly benefits most of 
the cooperative leaders. They instead wanted to share the money. They were told by the 
NGO that this was not possible for two reasons. For one thing the divided amount an 
individual would receive is too small to be invested in meaningful way, and the other 
reason was that the purpose of the project and the money that comes out of the project 
effort is to improve the livelihoods of the community by investing on infrastructure, 
health education, etc. 
 
Once the members understood the impossibility of dividing up the money, they proposed 
that what they needed collectively is the development of their particular Kebeles: and 
four Kebeles out of the seven asked the money to be used for the development of water 
points. According to cooperative leaders such development needs were presented during 
the training but the NGO redirected their focus to business. They were told that water 
point development is a project that is not for them to be engaged in, it is rather what 
government or NGO will do for the community as a responsible institution. Such 
development priorities of the community were also recorded in the PDD: 
…the benefits from the project should be spent on community priority 
development areas amongst which, water, both for drinking and irrigation, 
was the most suggested priority area by most Kebeles (PDD 2008: 76 ).  
After the transfer of money to all the cooperative accounts in 2010, no one wanted to 
invest the money so they kept it in the bank up to the end of 2011. In 2011, the NGO 
insisted and even warned the cooperatives to do the planned development program if they 
want to have another round of money in their bank account. When I was in the field, 
three of the cooperatives started building the store house. 
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We are now building a store and mill house because we do not know what 
to do (“Mehogna atene new”)21 .We want to save the money we have and 
when the second payment comes we want to invest it in building water 
infrastructure, the unsolved problem we have had for long now. This is 
what the community wants. The community did not want any profit making 
or business activities (M5) 
 
WVE claims that the development plan is purely the community’s plan. When confronted 
with the question of water they said that when each cooperative shared the total of the 
money that is paid out it will only be an amount of less than 100,000birr ($5,630 USD), 
except for Longena that has the largest share. So, they maintained that it is unrealistic for 
the community to plan water point construction with such very small finance. To this 
response, one could ask follow up questions: what about the next 9 years payments? 
What about finding other ways of financing in addition to the money they have?  But 
these are beyond the scope of this paper. 
   
There are also other aspects in the project where WVE takes the upper hand in deciding 
upon issues of community concern. This may be in order to make the project 
implementation easy, or also to give the project a bigger size. The latter has to do with 
qualifying for carbon project. For A/R CDM project to be qualified it needs to be 10,000 
ha, or if it is small-scale it must result in GHG removals of less than 16,000t CO2 per 
year (D. Kloss, Terra Global capital 2009 cited in Seeberg-Elverfeldt 2010:13). During 
community mobilizations, the communities in the seven Kebeles expressed their concern 
                                                          
21
  The Amharic word Mehogna atene new: it is a very strong word, which describes the difficult situation that 
people are in. It shows that things are beyond their capacity to handle. 
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on how and where they get fodder for their animals. The community asked the project to 
allocate part of the communal land for grazing. Such a demand on the part of the 
community was also recorded both in the WVE economic assessment and community 
consultation result reports. In the assessment report more than half of the sampled 
communities (66%) responded that they believed part of the land should be allocated for 
grazing, while only 30.5% suggested a total closure of the land (WVE 2006:13). In the 
PDD it simply noted that significant number from the sub-sample expressed strong 
support; when the fact is that more than half of the sample did not want a complete 
closure. Before the closure there was an understanding between the cooperatives and 
WVE to allocate a percentage of the land to each community. For example Abela 
Longena, Hobicha Bongota, Bolla and Bosa Wanche asked for 25% of their forest land to 
be allocated for grazing. However, WVE decided to close all the land without consulting 
the community and also without providing an alternative grazing land, which is one of 
the leakage prevention measures stated in the PDD.   
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Poaching inside the protected forest  
 
 
In the project area the sampled households were asked how they cope with shortage of 
fodder if the area is to be protected (see the table below for the results).  A significant 
number of the community responded that they will look for an alternative forest land. 
From the total sample population, 11.5 % and 14.5% respectively responded to use 
market and crop residues. What does this mean when we look at it in terms of CDM 
criterion and its objectives? One of the CDM criterions of forest projects is the issue of 
leakage: if the forest protection in Humbo leads to deforestation in Badanu, Chofre and 
Wachie or around Lake Abaya that makes the emission reductions of the project 
questionable. When the project creates an increase in the price of animal feed and 
firewood through its protection measures, it create difficulties on HH economy and also 
puts pressures on the household’s time, particularly on children who will be responsible 
for taking the animals to the distant forest areas. As I indicated elsewhere in this chapter, 
this would clearly have negative impacts on children’s schooling.  From the WVE 
assessment report, in most of the Kebeles, the distance to another forest area is on 
average a 2 to 3 hours walk.    
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Table 3:  How do you cope with shortage of fodder if the area will be protected for 
regeneration?  
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
 
  
Collect from other areas    67 33.5 
Buy from market  23 11.5 
Use crop residue  29 14.5 
Other  39 19.5 
 
Collect from other areas 
and buy from market  
9 4.5 
 
Collect from other areas 
and use crop residue  
25 12.5 
 Other  4 2.0 
 Total 196 98.0 
 
Source: WVE 2006 
According to WVE’s assessment, more than 60% of the communities are dependent on 
the communal land for their energy demands.  Recognizing this fact, the PDD outlined 
ways to address such needs (which remain only a plan on paper): 
To minimize the potential leakage in the form of fuel wood collection, this 
project will establish some fuel wood plantations to offset potential project 
leakage, however these are a small proportion of the project area, and will 
be used for the communities’ fuel wood supply rather than commercial 
purposes (PDD 2008:15). 
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As I indicated elsewhere in the chapter the forest has been the communities’ survival 
mechanism not only in times of drought but also for everyday life’s struggles.  This is 
also reflected in the socio-economic assessment report of WVE.  In the conclusion, the 
report describes how this impacts them: 
In the past whenever there was drought they can survive out of the sales of 
their livestock; poor people can also survive by selling fuel wood and 
fodder. If the sites are protected, they can no more get fodder and fuel 
wood, the only alternative they have is to abandon the area and to be 
resettled in another place (WVE 2006:16). 
 
Farmers in the area always struggle to sustain their annual harvest throughout the year, 
and every year they face shortages of food for four or more months.  In 2009 the Wereda 
agricultural bureau reported that 82,838 (66.1%) of the population were in need of food 
aid. From the report, I extracted the situation in the seven Kebeles. The table below 
indicates that more than 75% of the Kebeles population needs relief assistance and a 
significant number of children also malnourished. From the total Kebeles population, 
37.8% of them receive food aid every year for 5 to 6 months through the productive 
safety net program (Report 2009).  
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Table 4: Emergency food aid, nutrition and safety net support beneficiaries
22
   
kebeles Total population Safety net Emergency food aid Nutrition  Total aid 
re. 
Abela Gefeta  4927 1834 2020 707 4561 
Abela Longena 9512 2908 3700 1285 7893 
Abela Shoya  2243 1265 820 287 2372 
Hobicha Bongota  8434 2754 3500 1225 7479 
Hobicha Bada 10,938 4725 2000 700 7425 
Bosa Wanche  4938 1729 1500 525 3754 
Bola Wanche 2557 1225 245 200 1670 
 
Source: Adapted from Humbo Wereda agricultural bureau report (2009) 
 
The grave situation that the communities are in is well recognized by WVE, since most of 
the relief and safety net food distribution is done by them. But why does WVE not 
sufficiently address the needs of the community in this project? This is my next point of 
discussion. 
 
5.5 World Vision and Donors Relation 
As they are depicted in the literature and the common understanding of such institutions, 
World Vision are defenders of local interests and work towards poverty reduction and 
also environmental protection. WVE and WVA vision, mission and development 
                                                          
22
  A family cannot get both safety net and emergency food aid, but may be get nutrition support for their children. 
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objectives are consistent with the common understanding and the literature.  What causes 
one to question their interests and objectives is the issue of where their accountability 
lies.   
 
Development activities of NGOs in Africa depend on the flow of money from 
industrialized countries. Since 1970 their roles have become important in the 
development activities in many of African countries. The financial flows to them also 
increase because of the significant role NGOs play in development work, and also 
because of the decline of state institutions in development activities after structural 
adjustment programs. The growing critiques of African state legitimacy vis-a-vis donor 
democratization and the human rights agenda, as well as the growing dualistic view of 
state and NGO - the ‘good guys -bad guys’ approach - made NGOs a more viable partner 
for donors.  Donors are increasingly using NGOs through sub-contracting arrangements 
(Campbell 1996:2).  
 
Increasing donor support for NGOs brings the dilemma of their accountability and also 
conflicts of interest with states, since the state also competes for the similar resources. 
According to Jacobs and Wilford (2007), NGOs accountability lies “upwards” to their 
donor and “downwards” to the aid chain, from implementing NGO to beneficiaries.  
Some studies also indicate horizontal accountability, meaning accountability towards 
similar institutions. But there are no agreed upon standards or a particular approach for 
NGOs accountability, and true international accountability remains an “elusive goal” 
(McGann and Johnston 2006:72).  
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According to Edwards and Hulme (1995, cited in Jacobs and Wilford 2007:4), 
accountability is “the means by which individuals and organizations report to a 
recognized authority, or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions.” From this 
definition what matters is the action and the impact on society, rather than the NGO’s 
financial performance. If we are stressing more attention on the actions, then the question 
is how to address the gap between rhetoric and the practice of accountability? NGOs 
seem to have corporate style accountability to the donor, rather than to their actions 
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996c; Najam, 1996 cited in Ann Tilt 2006:8).  
 
If the NGO gives priorities to their stakeholders’ instead of the donors, their very 
existence will be in question because they may lose funding. So the whole question of 
accountability is a complex one. Like all the other NGOs, WVE always has to struggle 
for funding and fulfilling all the evaluation metrics that donors demanded. To address the 
growing demands of accountability to other stakeholders, WVE also has adopted 
mechanisms by including people’s voice in the reports and through review meetings with 
all local and national stakeholders once a year. But there are issues that are related to the 
project nature that force WVE to focus more on the interests of donors over the demands 
of the community. It is necessary here to look at WVE’s role itself in all the process of 
project development and execution. What exactly is WVE’s role?  Are they equal 
partners in this project?   
 
Like the other local stakeholders, WVE did not have the necessary skills or financial 
capacity to have had a powerful position in the process of developing this CDM project. 
On the other hand, WVA came with the finances and the necessary skills to develop the 
project, but also to influence the outcome of the project. Since WVA have the skills and 
the financial capacity regarding CDM projects, it gave them the power to seal the deal 
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with the WB. The PDD was in practice developed and provided to WVE by WVA and 
the WB. WVE’s role is like the government agricultural expert’s focus on data collection, 
community mobilization, organizing local community and on the implementation of the 
activities that are designed by WVA and WB. 
 
From its beginning the project is aimed to be a registered A/R CDM project; this in itself 
is a pressure on the project implementers for choosing the global over the local. To be a 
registered A/R CDM project, the project has to achieve the criterion outlined by UN 
which I discussed in the previous chapter.  For the project implementers and local 
partners, including the state, the idea of CDM was new and no one had the technical and 
financial capacity to be involved.  The costs of the A/R CDM certification process up to 
its registration was shown to range from $200,000-250,000 USD, according to Seeberg-
Elverfeldt (2010). The likely revenue for this particular project is $1.5 million USD from 
CER in a 10-year period and $160,000 USD from harvested firewood in a 30-year project 
period. Since most of the criteria demanded using one of the methodologies of the 
UNFCC, both WVE and the state have to depend on the expertise of WB and WVA.  
Yes, the criterion officially demands local participation, but it is obvious that the CDM 
program by itself defines the content of participation. CDM claims to address both 
greenhouse gas emission reductions and contributions to sustainable development in the 
host country; therefore, local people’s development needs have to be part of the PDD.   
 
The objective of cost-efficient emission reductions was the main driver behind the 
concept of CDM, and most of the criterion, monitoring and evaluation tools are 
developed to address those concerns. The institutions both within the UN and outside the 
UN system such as the financiers, international consultants, and the verifying companies’ 
Designated Operational Entity (DOEs) are involved. Their knowledge and expertise are 
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used to verify the carbon captured and to commodify this to generate value in the market-
system, and so all these actors and entities are formed toward addressing this particular 
interest. It shows the centrality of western scientific knowledge providing solutions to all 
global and local problems, even if the locals claim that the solutions create another set of 
difficulties for their survival, like the growing number of wild animals in the project area.  
 
When it comes to development objectives, the Marrakech Accord (2002) affirms that it is 
the responsibility of the host party to verify the sustainable development (SD) aspect of a 
CDM project.  The Ethiopian government’s focus on land degradation, which is regarded 
as one of the causes of rural poverty, and the fact that, like any other Non-Annex One 
Parties, having no power to influence the international market, made them set a low 
standard for SD. According to Bumpus and Liverman(2011:211) “Countries vary in rigor 
and definitions of what constitutes sustainable development, and have an incentive to 
sign off on a project that brings carbon finance to their business or conservation sector.” 
As I indicated at the beginning of the chapter, the Ethiopian government’s SD criterion 
are vague and focus more on environmental aspects.  The DNA signed an agreement and 
wrote the validation letter having a PDD that gives very little emphasis to the 
development aspect of the project.  The PDD do not have an explicit development plan, it 
simply mentions that the income earned from CER will be used for local infrastructural 
development. 
 
5.6 State relation with World Bank, NGOs and Cooperatives 
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in Africa, which depends on aid through direct 
budget support and in the form of relief and development assistance. Various researches 
indicate the relatively independent thinking of the Ethiopian government in its relation 
with donors as compared to other low income countries.   They indicate that none of the 
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donors have much impact influencing Ethiopian policies even if the popular 
understanding is more of donors imposition of policy on recipient countries (Fortado and 
Smith 2007, Borcgrevik 2008). Fortado and Smith (2007) indicated the increasing role of 
aid in Ethiopia since 1974, as a percentage of totals the average public spending it ranged 
from 25 to 45% in 2000 from 19% range of 1974-75. Their data shows that donors role 
became more influential now than it has been before. Borchgrevink (2008:1) on the other 
hand, explains this as both government internal strategies of resisting any imposition, and 
donors’ lack of coherent and coordinated strategies. Ethiopian government resistance to 
IMF financial market liberalization has been an example used in much of the literature:  
The IMF was pushing reforms in Ethiopia’s financial market that many 
economists argued were inappropriate for a country at that stage of 
development…The failure of the policies to achieve the Fund from pushing 
them, but these failures played an important role in the Ethiopian 
government resistance - it did not want its already desperately poor farmers 
to be further impoverished as a result of higher borrowing costs (Stieglitz 
2002: 247). 
The Ethiopian government did not want conditions attached to aid, particularly to the 
financial sector reforms where there is no consensus with donors like IMF and World 
Bank. Therefore IMF withdrew its lending (Borchgrevink 2008). Fartado and Smith 
(2007:6) argue that the Ethiopian government did not want any outsider involvement in 
internal issues, in their words “in the kitchen.” The World Bank, being a huge supplier of 
finance, has a special relation with the government (Fartado &Smith 2007).  The bank 
provides billions of dollars for about 148 projects in Ethiopia since 2008: 
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Table 5:  World Bank Loans to Ethiopian government 
Year Amount in millions $USD 
2008 720.05 
2009 1,145 
2010 890 
2011 630 
2012 520 
 
Source: Adapted from WB web-site http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/projects 
The Bank’s partnership with Ethiopia passed through political turmoil. The Bank 
manages to sustain its relationships through shifts in its lending strategies.  For instance, 
following the controversial 2005 election, the Bank shifts its support from direct budget 
to Protection of Basic Services (PBS). The Bank and government’s relationship has never 
been a cordial one. There are disagreements on some issues and at the same time 
consensus on some of them; the Bank interest in liberalization is one of the controversial 
issues. Most of the time, the Bank focuses its funding on issues where consensus is built 
in. In 2008, the Bank’s country assistance strategy paper noted some recommendations 
given by an independent evaluation group on its support to Ethiopia, and three of the 
recommendations are relevant to mention here (World Bank 2008:21): 
 Seek consensus within the country team and with Government on priority areas for 
support; 
 Restrict its interventions to policy dialogue and analytic work (rather than lending) 
in areas where there were clear policy disagreements with Government; 
 Continue to work closely with non-governmental stakeholders in Ethiopia 
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The Bank’s decision to work with WVE in this particular project comes from its 
particular interest to work with non-governmental organizations in Ethiopia. Such a 
decision of the Bank at the beginning of the project created conflict with government 
offices, particularly of the Ethiopian Environmental Authority (EPA).  The Authority 
wanted to own the project, and WB on the other hand, wanted WVE and WVA to own 
the project, so after a long negotiation (and convincing on the part of WB), the project 
was started by WVE as primary implementer. The EPA got $54,000 USD for capacity 
building support which, it was stated, would helps the institution to effectively regulate a 
similar project in future. The Bank argued that the knowledge base of WVA and the 
upfront finance being small for the government to be involved are part of the reasoning 
for the decision, in addition to the Bank’s interest in working with NGOs. 
For us, we do have the urge to work with civil society organizations.  
Teaming up with WVE was very important, given that in Ethiopia it is 
extremely difficult to find civil society engaged in things like that. In 2009 
the government came up with legislation that made it extremely difficult for 
civil society to engage.  So, for us it is an attempt to work outside of the 
government.  It was an opportunity for us because we are urging 
government to work with the private and civil society organizations. 
(Dwumfour, World Bank environmental expert)  
 
Government support at the beginning was not encouraging for WB, WVE or WVA. The 
fact that there was a knowledge gap on the part of the government officials, the Bank’s 
interest in direct involvement with the NGO, and issues of capacity made it difficult to 
start with sure footing, but through time the relationships changed to one of closer 
collaboration. EPA signed project agreement in collaboration with the NGO and the 
Bank.   
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5.7 State and NGO relationship 
According to Campbell (1996), there are three regimes in which NGOs can operate, with 
the Ethiopian case falling under the second category:  
The second regime type is the single-party state. Here, a government may 
tolerate NGOs, particularly if their projects complement the government’s 
development philosophy. There is, however, a greater risk of NGOs falling 
out of favour by following programmes independently of government and, 
especially, by opposing and criticizing government policies (Campbell 
1996:4). 
 
Government and NGO relations are complex, as Campell indicated, for they depend on 
“a diversity of philosophies and objectives between - and within – each” (Campbell 
1996:4). That mean not all NGOs are in conflict or in a rough spot with the state. NGO 
works that are related to the advancement of democracy and human rights, promotion of 
equality among nation and nationality, gender and religion, any type of rights-based 
projects, conflict resolution, justice and law enforcement, and any advocacy type are 
basically in conflict with the government. NGOs working with Service Provision might 
not lead to direct contention but this does not necessarily mean that there is no conflict of 
interest. NGO and government competition for the same financial sources is itself a major 
problem. Campbell (1996) recorded how the government associates direct financing 
NGOs on donors part as politically motivated agenda, and how it creates misgiving on 
the part of the Ethiopian state.  
 
In 2009, the Charities and Societies Proclamation came out with a clear restriction on the 
registration of such institutions. What happened was that those who were working in such 
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areas had to be registered as Ethiopian Charities or Societies
23
 in order to continue 
working on the same issues, and in addition it placed a restriction on their source of 
finance, for their main financing has to come from local source and only 10%  can be 
secured from outside sources. Those who registered outside of this category were allowed 
to work on service delivery, poverty reduction, environmental protection, and in 
advancement of education, health and relief assistance when needed(Tsehai 2010:166). 
(There are other articles that focus on registration and regulations of NGOs, but which 
are outside of the scope of this paper). In general, this proclamation is considered one of 
the most severe laws from all directives and guidelines that the country issued and was 
considered restrictive at the time. 
   
WVE is registered at the national level to provide services for the community but must 
have implementation agreement with the regional states to engage with the community. 
Regional and local level administration offices are the ones directly involved in the 
implementation of the development policies and strategies. Most of WVEs’ every day 
contact and interaction are with local government apparatuses, unlike WB dealing at the 
national level. At the local level government offices, WVE agreed that their relationships 
have improved, but they both claim that it could have been better if the other put in more 
effort and increased transparency. WVE is involved in providing direct institutional 
support to regional government line offices in the form of training and in resources 
provision. Government offices provide expertise in the area of agricultural and natural 
resource management when their expertise is needed, as well as providing and facilitating 
duty free access for the NGO. There is also a taskforce where the government line 
department and NGOs discuss issues of concern. 
                                                          
23 The Proclamation creates three categories of charities and societies. These are:  Ethiopian 
Charities or Societies,  Ethiopian Residents Charities or Societies  and,  Foreign 
Charities or Societies 
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On the local government side, there is appreciation in general of what WVE has been 
doing for past 20 years, or more specially, on water development, both drinking and 
irrigation, and improvements in health and education. The critics are more focused on 
WVE’s lack of transparency in its project agenda and its disregard for the expertise and 
experience of government offices in some aspects of their project implementation. This 
applies, for example, in regard to irrigation and trench development, and development 
planning and implementation in general. 
 
WVE/ADP coordinators and staff claim that their relations with local government have 
improved and can be regarded as ‘good’, but there are issues that they pointed out as 
challenges in their relationship. Instability both in terms of government structure and 
staffing, lack of capacity (both financial and labour), inflexibility and lack of motivation 
on the part of government staff are the main points which emerged as barriers. Those in 
the government office agreed that they have limitations that relate to finance and skills 
both at the Zonal and Wereda levels, which limits their involvement in the project both as 
a regulator and as project partners: 
Since the project concept is new to the country, we cannot claim to be able 
to run it having the required knowledge. WVE is also depending on the 
knowledge of its partner WVA. Those in the regional bureau who are 
suppose to provide us with technical knowledge only have the general 
concepts. For example, our role on the market aspect of the project is 
insignificant actually; it is the thing that is far away from us. We do not 
know how things are running in this aspect. We only have the project 
document; we do not have documents that shows the carbon trade or 
agreements of such an exchange (Aberham Bosha, Zonal Agricultural and 
Resource Bureau Head) 
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Another official also said: 
Our understanding of carbon sequestration and its market is limited. We do 
not know where the market is and how the market runs. WVE is the one 
who knows about this all and they made the knowledge of all this difficult 
to get to (Yohannes Abota, Cooperative promotion expert).   
 
WVE, however, blames the government’s structural instability and the frequent change of 
officials and staff. Those who received training and have taken part in the project 
activities leave the position without being able to transfer the knowledge, and when they 
leave, some of them even take the documents with them. Government officials claim that 
WVE is secretive about its project activities, and in some cases it is even difficult for 
them to get project documents. They said their relationship is based on the demands of 
WVE. The relations are basically strong whenever WVE have difficulties with 
communities, and when donors demand them to work together.  
 
Both entities want to keep their autonomy intact. NGOs suspect local government 
intentions whenever unusual kinds of demands, outside of relief or financial support, are 
pursued. The main good thing about this particular project is that both groups have a 
shared interest in the value of conservation of the forest for the ‘common good of the 
community’. 
 
5.8 State and cooperative relationship 
State and Cooperative Society relationships are a controversial issue in Ethiopia. As 
indicated in the beginning of the chapters, cooperatives has been misused by the state and 
there are still such practices on the part of the state, but what made the issue controversial 
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is cooperatives now formed through different channels for different purposes. During the 
socialist regime and at the beginning of their revival in 1990s, the government was the 
initiator of such institutional formation, but now NGOs are also involved in initiating 
such establishments. There are examples of cooperatives in every Zonal and Wereda 
level, and cooperative promotion offices that formed by NGOs that crumble when the 
project phases-out.   
 
Government as a powerful player in the country can play a dominant role in every 
institution through its law making, executive and judiciary bodies, and at all level of the 
structure. Like every other institution, cooperatives in general have a direct relationship 
to the state in that sense. But when it comes to practical relations, their role and services 
within the community are more of a motive for the government to establish strong ties 
than from the mere presence of them in general.    For example, the state has a strong 
(one can say a dominant) role in the day to day activities of multipurpose service 
cooperatives as compared to  the seven cooperatives that have been established to 
manage the Humbo forest. The multipurpose cooperatives were formed to provide the 
rural Kebeles with agricultural input, other food related items, and more importantly, to 
regulate the market, for they buy grain in times of harvest and sell it back to the 
community when it is desperately needed. In every group of three Kebeles, there exists 
one multipurpose service cooperative.  
 
By law, the cooperative societies are entitled to have land free of lease, to receive 
technical assistance from government line offices, to access credit, and to get necessary 
legal assistance (Proclamation no.111/2007). When asked, all cooperative leaders said 
their relations with the government are limited and those that they had were mostly 
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facilitated by WVE. For all the supports that are stated in the proclamation, most are in 
practice non-existent because of the capacity problems stated earlier in this chapter. 
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6. Conclusion 
The findings of this research lead us to question two significant discourses that are the 
glue of sustainable development and natural resources management: the discourse of 
community participation and ‘win-win’ rhetoric.  
 
The principle of participation is the one that allows local stakeholders to define their 
basic needs and how they can best be addressed. The practice of participation is a 
different interpretation of such principle; it allows local people’s participation in order to 
discuss the already decided agenda of the powerful players. In the chapter previously, I 
discussed how local community participation was addressed by the powerful actors in 
this case.  The local community was directly or indirectly forced to take part in the 
management of the communal land. Their interest and concerns are not given due 
consideration, even if they were recorded in various ways, such as through WVE’s socio-
economic assessment and consultation meetings.  The reason for such disregard for the 
interest of local participant is because the conservation agenda and practices are already 
defined globally, so there appear to be no ways of accommodating community demands 
within the project framework without compromising the main carbon offset targets.    
 
The talk of participation in the areas of environment and development tend to overlook 
the importance of power asymmetries. The underling inequalities of local, national and 
international actors are what form conservation outcomes.  All the agendas and interests 
of the powerful actors become the core elements of resource management. When natural 
resources management depends on technology and market mechanisms as the only way 
forward, it simply justifies the monopoly of the powerful groups. The complex criteria, 
standards and certification process of the CDM indicate its managerial, expert-oriented 
nature and the limited role that it delegates to the local stakeholders. Since the local 
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stakeholders do not have the required knowledge and finance to achieve such complex 
managerial process, they remain as peripheral participants. The content of participation of 
local stakeholders and the benefits they will get out of such conservation are pre-
determined at the global level. 
 
The debate surrounding the benefit of forest management to the local community, and to 
poverty reduction in general indicates the ambiguous nature of the notion of benefits. The 
ambiguity starts from the fact that the various stakeholders have their own definition of 
benefits. Establishing consensuses on such benefits among the local, national and 
international stakeholders needs a definition of benefit both from the environmental 
services and socio-economic concerns.  The rationale behind CDM is its objective in 
addressing the environmental and economic needs of developed and developing nations 
respectively.  But both in theory and practice, the two objectives are handled differently. 
Complex standards and institutions are formed to establish and regulate the carbon 
offsets, when the development aspect of it is left to national governments of the 
developing nation. The government of the developing nation has little to bargain with to 
establish strong SD standards, due to the CDM’s global scope. Strong SD criteria also 
compromised by the number and type of investors the countries can attract, in which case 
the reduction of GHG is prioritized at the expense of the SD agenda. 
 
As I indicated in the previous chapter, the DNA verify the project  claiming that it goes 
with the country’s SD strategies, without  having  the details of the SD plan. In the PDD, 
the SD aspect is neglected in 86 pages, excluding annexes, with SD issues discussed in 
only 2 pages. Still, from the PDD we can see the defined benefits; community ownership 
over the communal land, sustainable fuel wood supply, job creation, and $1.5 million 
USD from CER over the crediting period. But here is no clear plan or activities towards 
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achieving SD. The SD aspect is simply left for the newly organized farmer’s 
cooperatives.  
 
As indicated in the chapter before, land ownership issues are controversial. Local 
communities believe that they have lost their communal land. Community ownership 
means benefitting from the use value of the resources, not the simple fact of having a 
legal paper. Issues of access to fuel wood and animal feed in the project area are sensitive 
issues which need reexamination on the part of project developers, particularly WVE and 
WVA. The promised alternative grazing land and firewood supply are practically non-
existent, so local communities are left alone to deal with the ramifications which has 
forced some of them to sell their livestock. Such measures will impact the coping 
mechanisms of families which increases their dependency on meager harvests throughout 
the year.  
 
The overall focus of the project has also become a concern for the local authorities, 
particularly the agricultural and natural resource department and the cooperative 
promotion office. They believe the conservation measures of the project will negatively 
affect the sustainable management of the resource itself.  Since the sustainable protection 
of the forest depends on people’s relation to the resource, so it is important and necessary 
for the project to establish community ownership in a different sense from only the legal 
sense of owning the resource. In one of the cooperative promotion evaluations, the 
executive committees of Hobicha Bongota responded that in the absence of forest guards, 
more than half of their members would immediately march towards the forest with the 
machetes in their hands. In all the interviews that I did with the cooperative leaders, 
members and non-members, not one ever referred to the forest as theirs; all referred it as 
a state forest.   
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Whenever they were asked to compare the benefit of the forest before and after the 
project, after a long bout of laughter, they would state “berawe yegan benebere gezema” 
translated as “when the forest was ours.” As I indicated in the chapter previously, the use 
value of the forest is very important. When people were asked about the benefits of the 
project, their immediate response was that they attended training courses, but when one 
probed into the benefits of attending training, this was mainly associated with the per 
diem that they received during the training time. How long does the organization plan to 
provide such a benefit? Next to that, the benefit of the temporary job of planting seedling 
and pruning was mentioned, but this is no longer available since the planting phase of the 
project is over now. The project ultimately provides only 22 permanent jobs for the local 
community. Sharing mechanisms of the income from carbon selling seems problematic 
because of numerous institutional weaknesses, both in cooperatives’ capacity and 
autonomy which leads us to question the future of SD aspects in general. The overall 
project outcomes in terms of SD will not help to live up to the ‘win-win’ rhetoric that it 
vows to uphold.    
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